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Abstract 
The study asks what role Karl Marx’s theory of the law of the tendency of the rate 
of profit to fall has in explaining transformation, crises and secular stagnation in 
Sweden. Support is presented for the “law”, with Sweden exhibiting a long-term 
secular decline in the rate of profit throughout the late 19th and 20th century. For 
the period 1950-2016, there is a strong tendency towards “Marx-biased”, labour-
saving and capital-using technical change, which is the underlying driver towards 
the fall in profitability. Periods of declining profitability is also found to be 
periods of relatively higher real GDP growth. It is argued that sharp competition 
and rapid productivity growth, quite counter-intuitively, leads to a decline in 
average profitability. One reason for this is the tendency towards increasing 
outlays on fixed capital and a diminishing wage-share to retain competitiveness, 
the side-effect being an erosion of the “demand-base” of the accumulation 
process; a tendency augmented by the “third industrial revolution” and the 
“neoliberal” political-economic regime. The so-called secular stagnation in the 
wake of the financial crisis of 2007/8 is argued to be an expression of these 
developments. Furthermore, analysing the Industrial Golden Age of the Swedish 
Model, and its metamorphosis into a more “neoliberal” political-economic regime 
in the late 20th / early 21st, the thesis claims that one significant driving force of 
this transformation has been the secular decline in profitability. 
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1 – Introduction 
The U.S. and the Eurozone have yet to recover to pre-crisis output growth, and 
unemployment remains high. It’s argued that the West has found itself in a secular 
stagnation. In order to understand how this stagnation came to be, it’s important to relate it to 
the structural transformations and political developments during the latter half of the 20th 
century and early 21st century, or more closely between 1946 and 2016. The present study 
takes a Swedish focus on the topic and investigates the phenomenon with regard to Karl 
Marx’s theory of the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall as a central feature in 
explaining both transformation as well as the present stagnation. The purpose of the study can 
thus be said to be: to explore the explanatory-power of the “law” with regard to crises, 
stagnation and transformation, but moreover how the “law” is impacted by and in turn 
affects developments in Swedish political economy. 
Two hypotheses will be posed as a point of departure: 
Hypothesis #1: Does Sweden experience a long-term secular decline in its general profit 
rate? 
Hypothesis #2: Does Sweden demonstrate a “Marx-biased technical change”? 
After evaluating these hypotheses, and relating the movements in profitability to 
developments in Swedish political economy, the study will concern itself more closely with 
the secular stagnation hypothesis and how it relates to the “law” and political economy. 
2 – Secular stagnation: Reduced supply or fading demand? Stagnating 
or accelerating technological growth?  
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007/8, and the subsequent Eurocrisis of 2011, the 
“Secular Stagnation Hypothesis” – first put forward by Alvin Hansen after the 1930s Great 
Depression – has seen a revival, in response to the fact that the U.S. and the Eurozone have 
yet to recover to pre-crisis output growth trends, with unemployment remaining stubbornly 
high (Summers 2014:30; Jimeno et al 2014:154; Storm 2017:2). 
According to theory, the interest rate – “the price of money” – is determined by the supply of 
savings and the demand for investment in an economy. While excess savings drives interest 
rates down, excess investment pushes them up. The point where real interest rates (nominal 
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interest rate minus the inflation rate) balance savings and investments at full-employment is 
referred to as the “natural/neutral” interest rate (Summers 2016). Alvin Hansen argued for the 
possibility of there being no achievable interest rate that “will permit the balancing of saving 
and investment at full employment” (Summers 2014:32). Secular stagnation “refers to a 
situation in which saving can only equal investment at a negative real interest rate” (Jimeno 
et al 2014:154). Larry Summers thus warns that “a decline in the full-employment real 
interest rate [which] coupled with low inflation could indefinitely prevent the attainment of 
full employment” (Summers 2014:31-32), since in an output slowdown, wages and prices (if 
flexible) are expected to fall (i.e. low inflation), leading to increasing real interest rates. In the 
case of deflation, then this scenario would be aggravated, leading to even higher real interest 
rates, generating greater output shortfalls as it becomes more expensive to borrow for 
investments, which could lead to further deflation when prices fall more due to dropping 
demand. 
Summers argue that the real interest rate is low due to a variety of structural changes, such as: 
slower population growth, and potentially slower technological growth; low-priced capital 
goods; rising inequality; increased friction in financial intermediation; central banks 
conservative investment strategies and accumulation of reserves; among other factors, 
contributing to lessen the demand. In principle, this could be solved by pumping up demand, 
and if not, Summer warns that the lack of demand can create a lack of supply – an inverse of 
Say’s law (ibid:36-37). Storm have similarly emphasised lessening demand due to “rising 
inequality, growing polarization, and the vanishing middle class” in the U.S. (Storm 2017:4). 
While aforementioned authors view the secular stagnation as a result of lack of demand (a 
growing gap between actual and potential output), Robert Gordon instead sees it as a problem 
of waning supply (a decline in the potential output growth) over the coming 25-40 years for 
the U.S. (Gordon 2014:48). The source of this slow growth isn’t mainly due to decelerating 
technological change but rather due to four “headwinds” consisting of: (1) a future decline in 
labour-force participation due to an ageing population and declining participation due to 
weak economic conditions; (2) declining high school completion rates, and crippling student 
debts, combined with the inability of 40% of college graduates to find jobs appropriate for 
their education; (3) income inequality and precarisation of jobs; (4) increasing government 
debt-to-GDP ratio and lessening future tax revenue growth (ibid:50-51).  
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In addition, stagnating or slowing technological growth has been argued to be an underlying 
cause of the secular stagnation, both in the U.S. and the Eurozone, preceding the crisis by 
decades. Declining growth in total factor productivity (TFP)1 has been argued to explain the 
slowing investment demand, since it leads to a fewer set of profitable investment 
opportunities (Jimeno et al 2014:156). Gordon, although not assuming a slowing 
technological growth in his model, is rather pessimistic about the prospects of future 
technological growth. TFP growth rates reached an exceptionally high order of magnitude in 
the U.S. economy during the period of 1920-1970 – a period when technologies implemented 
in the 1870s finally became fully diffused – after which there’s been a marked decline in 
productivity growth. Gordon thinks it’s unlikely that future productivity growth will be any 
higher than the low rates of the past 40 years (Gordon 2014:53-54). 
One explanation for the slowing TFP growth is the growing share of labour-intensive and 
technologically stagnant activities in total output, a so-called “growth disease”. This is related 
to Baumol’s cost disease.  
Baumol & Bowen original argument was that there is a “productivity lag” between the 
performing arts and activities which apply more machinery. The productivity of for example 
manufacturing is easier to augment by innovating or expanding the machine-park, while it’s 
more difficult to reduce the labour-time needed in performing arts, without the quality of the 
act suffering. Since all branches of the economy compete to hire workers in the same 
nationally integrated labour market, wages tend to increase as much in the “lagging” 
activities as in the general economy. Therefore, costs and prices in labour-intensive and 
technologically stagnant branches, such as live performing arts, will rise relative to costs and 
prices in the economy as a whole (Heilbrun 2003:92; Nordhaus 2008:3). It’s this 
phenomenon that is referred to as Baumol’s cost disease.  
This productivity lag will, on a societal level, engender a “growth disease” as labour-
intensive and technologically stagnant activities such as government, education, and 
construction appropriate a larger share of national output, therefore slowing aggregate 
productivity growth over time. Nordhaus (2008:22) and Hartwig (2011:483) find that both 
the U.S. and European Union have caught this disease during the latter part of the 20th 
century (1948-2001 for the U.S. and 1970-2005 for the EU-15).  
                                                          
1 Total-factor productivity accounts for the sources of output growth as caused by capital accumulation, labour 
inputs, and a “residual”, which is the part of growth that cannot be explained by the former two, often taken as 
an indicator for technological change. 
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The concept of total factor productivity is a contested one. Seervas Storm criticizes the idea 
that TFP would be a supply-side phenomenon, instead emphasising that “potential output 
growth is not independent from actual – demand determined – growth” (Storm 2017:8). 
Anwar Shaikh notes that the “Solow residual”, that is taken as “technical change” in the TFP-
measure, is nothing but “a weighted average of the growth rates of the wage w and rate of 
profit r” (Shaikh 1974:118), and does not actually measure technical change or productivity 
at all. Storm further argues that TFP growth to an overwhelmingly degree is determined by 
labour-productivity growth, suggesting that one should apply Occam’s razor and ditch the 
TFP altogether. And since labour-productivity is partly determined by real wage growth, the 
secular stagnation of productivity growth in the U.S. is partly attributed to the long-term 
decline in the growth rate of U.S. hourly real wages, which in turn is associated with the 
“neoliberal political regime” shifting away from full-employment towards low and stable 
inflation, labour-market deregulation, dismantling of social safety nets, and undermining of 
the bargaining power of unions (Storm 2017:21). Measuring real labour-productivity, Storm 
finds that there is a Baumolian pattern of “unbalanced growth”, where the secular decline in 
aggregate U.S. productivity growth is hiding a divergence between a “dynamic sector” (of 
“manufacturing”, “information & communication services”, “financial, insurance, & real 
estate services”, and “professional & business services”) which is actually experiencing an 
acceleration of productivity from the period of 1947-1972 to 1995-2008. The stagnation 
instead seems to lie in “construction”, “education, health & private social services”, and “art, 
entertainment, recreation, food, etc.”. Storm argues that the secular decline in aggregate 
productivity growth is associated with the polarisation of the U.S. labour market, where 
mediocre jobs and “alternative work arrangements” have constrained real wages and working 
conditions, and leading to a polarisation between higher-paying jobs in “dynamic” sectors, 
and lower-paying jobs in “stagnating” sectors. The resultant slowing average real wage 
growth tend to decelerate productivity growth, capital intensity, and aggregate demand 
(ibid:22-33). 
Other argues that we in fact are experiencing acceleration in innovation associated with ICT, 
expressed as “secular joblessness” (Glaeser 2014:74-76). These prophecies have been 
whispered before, both by John Maynard Keynes in 1930 and Wassily Leontief in 1952 that 
expected that workers would eventually be replaced by machines. So far, these predictions 
have yet to be materialised, but recently, these forecasts have been picked up again by several 
authors, arguing that we are now on the verge of seeing them realised. 
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What’s different with this round of technical change? Frey & Osborne argue that due to a 
secular price decline in the real cost of computing, and the increasing ability to turn non-
routine tasks into well-defined problems susceptible for computerisation, an estimated 47% 
of total U.S. employment are considered to be in the high-risk category, their occupations 
being very susceptible for automation in the near future. The occupations most susceptible for 
automation are transportation, logistics, office and administrative support, as well as 
production occupations. But they also find that “a substantial share of employment in 
services, sales and construction occupations exhibit high probabilities of computerisation” 
(Frey & Osborne 2013:41) – supposedly “technologically stagnant activities”.  
In a recent paper, Acemoglu & Restrepo argue that there is no guarantee that these 
technological advances presumed by Frey & Osborne, would necessarily materialize, since it 
would depend on: (1) the cost of substituting machines for labour, and corresponding wage 
change to this substitution; (2) the labour market impacts of the new technologies, where 
some sectors and occupations might expand to soak up labour freed from technological 
advancements. Thus, they try to “move beyond these feasibility studies” and “estimate the 
equilibrium impact” of industrial robots on US labour markets (Acemoglu & Restrepo 
2017:1-2). Their resulting scenarios suggest that until 2025 – depending on the estimated 
growth of stock of robots – the growth of the employment to population ratio would shrink 
between 0.54-1% in the conservative scenario, and 0.94-1.76% in the more “aggressive” 
scenario; and lower wage growth to between 0.75-1.5% in the conservative scenario, and 1.3-
2.6% in the aggressive scenario (ibid:36-37).  
Research on the effects of computerisation on a global scale is scarce, but some studies exist 
on how it engenders a global decline of labour’s share (total compensation) in GDP. 
Karabarbounis & Neiman documents a 5% decline in the global labour share in the corporate 
sector since the 1980s. They find that trade-integration of relatively “labour-abundant” and 
“wage-competitive” countries such as China and India, doesn’t seem to have any effect on 
the labour shares of the rest of the world – indeed, these labour-abundant countries also 
experience a declining labour share. Rather, 90% of the declines in labour shares reflect 
within-industry declines, being the result of falling relative price of investment goods relative 
consumption goods. They conclude that increased productivity in capital producing sectors 
associated with ICT seem to induce a global shift away from labour (Karabarbounis & 
Neiman 2013:8-12). 
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The nature of the third industrial revolution is argued to be of such a kind, as to even render 
the conventional tools of measurement for output and productivity growth obsolete. While 
it’s commonly known that GDP underestimate wealth, Brynjolfsson & McAfee (2016:107ff) 
suggest that it’s increasingly becoming misleading. Because many new services and goods – 
in the wake of the third industrial revolution – have been heavily reduced in price or even 
have “zero price”, these products are heavily underestimated or virtually invisible in the 
official statistics. And since productivity data are based on GDP metrics, the increasing 
availability of free goods does not transfer over to productivity measures. Indeed, the 
proliferation of free products even lowers GDP in some instances, even though well-being 
increases. As such, production have more and more come to depend on intangible assets such 
as intellectual property, organizational capital, user-generated content, and human capital – 
relative to physical equipment and structures. This hypothesis has been met with critique 
from Storm (2017) arguing that the stagnation is due to actual productivity stagnation, not 
merely the result of mismeasurement. 
2.1 – Stagnation & structural cycles in Swedish economic history 
The demand-view of a gap between potential and actual output has been echoed in the 
Swedish debate on the “seven lost years”, referring to the stagnating productivity between 
2007 and 2014. The stagnation is regarded to be one of slow technological development and 
low rate of investment (KI 2015). Both the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (Svenskt 
Näringsliv) and the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen) notes that 
productivity growth has been close to null, 0.1%, viewing the problem as one of lacking 
demand (SN 2015; LO 2015). In addition, an extended period of low inflation or even 
deflation has prevailed, with the Swedish Riksbank lowering the prime lending interest rate to 
sub-zero rates since 2015 in order to spur investment and inflation. Although inflation has 
approached the 2% goal in recent years, unemployment remains high and the low interest 
rates provide fuel for a worrisome accretion of household debt (Svensson 2014; Sveriges 
Riksbank 2017).  
From the perspective of structural analysis, the stagnation would be seen as just a momentary 
impasse; an instance on the road towards transformation and revitalisation of the economy. 
Lennart Schön argues that the economy goes through structural cycles of transformation and 
rationalisation. What drives these cycles are different Development blocks – complementary 
activities around innovations, with a definite set of demand and supply functions that creates 
imbalances which attract entrepreneurial activity and investments – that are formed 
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throughout the process. In phases of transformation industrial structures are changed, with a 
subsequent reallocation of resources between industries and diffusion of innovations, with an 
emphasis on capacity-raising investments in new areas of production. The effects on 
productivity are often delayed due to shortages in supply of competence and the need of 
learning processes. During phases of rationalisation on the other hand, resources are 
concentrated to the most productive units within branches, with emphasis on increasing 
efficiency. Investments are directed towards cost-reducing and resource-saving measures, 
with more direct effects upon productivity, growth and real income (Schön 2009:3-5). The 
Swedish economy is argued to alternate between transformation and rationalisation with a 
regularity of approximately 40 years; with about 25 years emphasising transformation, and 15 
years emphasising rationalisation, with structural crises marking the end of a structural cycle. 
In its wake, new developmental blocks are diffused, marking a new wave of transformation, 
followed by rationalisation (ibid:6).  
These structural crises have occurred in the 1840s, 1890s, 1930s, 1970s, and currently in the 
2010s. The structural crisis in 1975/80, marked the shift from the development block formed 
around electrification and the combustion engine, towards one centred on microprocessors 
and electronics. The Swedish economy experienced a transformation phase up until 1990/95, 
as investment rose faster than output to increase industry’s capacity, labour and resources 
were reallocated, productivity growth was low, and “creative destruction” took place. In the 
subsequent rationalisation phase that lasted up until the 2010s, investments has risen slower 
than output (but increasing the share of investments in machinery), indicating efficient use of 
existing capacity, accelerated labour-productivity and enhanced competitive-power of 
industry (Schön 2009:9-12,16-17; Edvinsson 2010a:670,677). Moreover Schön argues that 
after the crisis decade of the 2010s, a phase of transformation awaits (Edvinsson 2010a:676).  
Several critiques have been directed towards Schön’s theoretical framework;2 not only is 
there a tendency towards working out a “clockwork” theory of cycles with the pretension of 
                                                          
2 Schön argues the structural cycles are driven by constant disruptions of equilibrium created by the 
development blocks as the economy transforms, engendering a succeeding period of “convergence” towards 
neoclassical conditions, which eventually is disrupted anew by another developmental block (Schön 2009:6). 
The proposition of the current author, while rejecting the neoclassical leanings of the perspective, rather sees 
profitability (and crises of overaccumulation; see section 3.2.1) as driving the emergence of different 
“development blocks”, which undergoes rationalisation up until it gives rise to overproduction of the 
output/goods of said “development block”. New development blocks arise out of profitability crises, which of 
course are related to political and international developments, following a discontinuous trend not necessarily 
conforming to any periodisation. This could be the basis for future research. 
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predicting economic developments (Edvinsson 2010a:673), trying “to encapsulate these 
phenomena under deterministic equilibrating representations“, effectively turning cycles into 
“intermittent equilibrium […] under the form of two attractors (the maximum and the 
minimum levels of the tide)” (Freeman & Louçã 2001:119). Empirical criticisms have been 
raised as well, arguing that the pattern of transformation and rationalisation has been broken 
during the 1970s; with investment rising slower than output already in the 1970/80s, and the 
share of machinery-investments has declined, and exports increased, contrary to what is 
expected of a rationalisation phase (Edvinsson 2010a:673). 
2.2 – Disposition & contribution of present study 
The secular stagnation hypothesis not only brings into question the nature of depressions – as 
a demand-side or supply-side problem – but also the nature of technological change – which 
seem to be stagnating and accelerating at the same time, depending on theoretical 
perspective. In addition, the discussion brings attention to the relationship between 
productivity and economic growth. This study aims to explore some of these issues from a 
Marxian perspective. According to Keynesian theory, increases in aggregate demand is what 
propels total output growth in the long run, but according to Marxian theory, profitability 
precedes demand, determining investment-demand – therefore also the demand for funding, 
hence impacting interest rates – in the economy which in turn generates output, employment, 
and wage growth. Marx argued that capital accumulation as such has a tendency towards 
depressing the profit rate, as competition drives firms to cost-cutting and productivity-
enhancing measures, implying successively growing outlays on capital assets and shedding 
labour in order to gain competitive advantages, simultaneously undermining the demand-base 
as the wage-share drops. Where profitability descends, speculation and bubbles takes off. As 
a result, capital accumulation throws the economy into crisis, stagnation and depression. The 
profitability is what drives and unites movements in both supply and demand.  
3 – Theory & previous research 
This part outlines the Marxian perspective on the law of the tendency of the profit rate to fall, 
and how it arises out of the normal workings of capital accumulation. 
3.1 – The General formula of capital, the labour-process & the circulation process 
For Karl Marx, capital isn’t merely the stock of assets, or wealth, but a process of value set in 
motion; the process of wealth-creation by means of commodity exchange on a market, 
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mediated by money, which is the independent expression of value (Ramsay 2015:8). His 
General Formula for Capital is very simple, but a pregnant and succinct observation:  
𝑀 → 𝐶 < 𝑚𝑝
𝐿 … 𝑃 … 𝐶′ → 𝑀′ 
The purpose of capitalist commodity production is the advancement of value, expressed as a 
sum of money capital (M), for the purchase of commodity capital (C), in the form of labour-
power (L) and means of production (mp), which through the production process is rendered 
into production capital (P), resulting in a commodity capital with an incremental increase 
(𝐶′ = 𝐶 + ∆𝐶) that, through exchange is realised into an incrementally increased sum of 
money capital (𝑀′ = 𝑀 + ∆𝑀). The increment ∆M is what is referred to as surplus-value. 
The formula is often simplified as 𝑀 → 𝐶 → 𝑀′. This incrementally increased sum of money 
capital is the telos of the whole process (Marx 1976:247ff; 1978:109ff).  
Like the classical political economists, Marx similarly argued that labour was the sole source 
of value and hence surplus-value in capitalist society. One vital alteration of the labour theory 
of value set Marx apart from the classics: it’s not the privately concrete labour, and the 
individual labour-time expended by isolated producers within a branch that creates value (in 
that case, a good would be worth more the longer the producer worked on it), but rather, what 
counts as value-creating labour is the amount of abstract labour expended, whose magnitude 
is determined by the socially necessary labour-time. 
Socially necessary labour-time is the labour-time required to produce any use-value 
under the conditions of production normal for a given society and with the average 
degree of skill and intensity of labour prevalent in that society. (Marx 1976:129) 
Simply put: the average or regulating productivity-level. To what extent the privately 
expended labour of individual capitals counts as value-creating, depends on how it measures 
up to the social average of productivity. Capitalists producing a good by expending less 
labour than the social average will be regarded as more efficient in the competitive struggle, 
and consequently be able to gain market-shares with their cost-advantage, and receive higher 
profits; while capitalists who expend labour above the average, will receive lower profits due 
to their relative inefficiency. The labour-time socially necessary for the production of a 
particular use-value is always changing; if the productivity of labour increases, the more 
products can be created in the same time-span, and thus the socially necessary labour-time for 
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producing that item diminish, and with it the value of the article, hence it experiencing a 
cheapening (Heinrich 2012: 43,51-52).  
Furthermore, Marx emphasised the significance as to what degree the commodities produced 
must be a part of the monetary/payable demand prevailing in society; one has to produce not 
only a use-value, but “use-values for others, social use values”. A use-value of which there’s 
no demand for, contains no value (Marx 1976:131). 
Outlays on means of production (machinery, raw materials, etc.), or constant capital, c, 
merely transfer their bestowed value – itself determined by the labour-time expended on it – 
onto the product (Marx 1976:307ff). Since “the quantity of constant capital transferred cannot 
be greater [therefore constant] than the original quantity of constant capital advanced” it 
cannot be a source of value and surplus-value (Moseley 2016:30). The only commodity on 
the market whose use-value consists in the ability of being a creator of value is labour-
power,3 whose value is determined by “the value of the means of subsistence necessary for 
the maintenance of [the working class]”, as well as by the claims workers are able to assert in 
the class struggle (Marx 1976:274 quote from here; Heinrich 2012:94). Outlays on wages for 
labour-power is called variable capital, v. 
Labour functions as a source of value in a twofold way: Not only does labour put the 
means of production to work, but wage-earners are needed in order to absorb the 
commodities produced, which profit-earners are dependent upon in order to generate the 
monetary means to purchase means of production, to be utilised to strengthen their position in 
the competitive market-struggle, from which they’ll capture profits. I.e. labour make out the 
reproductive demand-base. The magnitude of value, in turn, is determined by the socially 
necessary labour-time. I.e. the regulating/average labour-productivity becomes the 
benchmark of competitiveness to which the participants have to adapt.  
In the overall accumulation process, the labour process encompass 𝑀 → 𝐶′, with the 
subsequent movement 𝐶′ → 𝑀′, constituting the circulation process. The process could be 
summarised by the following equations, starting with the labour process:4 
The initial sum of money advanced equals the outlays for constant and variable capital. 
                                                          
3 The very existence of labour-power as a commodity necessitates a specific class relationship – the capital-
relation, as Marx called it – with on the one hand “a class of property owners (owners of money and means of 
production), and on the other hand there must exist a class of largely propertyless, but legally free workers” 
(Heinrich 2012:91-92). 
4 The following equations are informed by Freeman (1996:4-6).  
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𝑀 = 𝑐 + 𝑣 
The incrementally increased commodity capital, before realisation in circulation (sale), is 
equal to constant capital plus the new value created by labour. 
𝐶′ = 𝑐 + 𝐿 
Of the new value created, a part of it consists of replacement cost for the outlays on variable 
capital, the residual being the surplus-value generated (Moseley 2016:30).  
𝐿 = 𝑣 + 𝑠 
𝑠 = 𝐿 − 𝑣 
(The ratio of the constituent parts of this new value L, being the rate of surplus-
value/exploitation 𝑠′ = 𝑠/𝑣; a higher rate of exploitation contributes to increasing the profit 
rate [section 3.2.1].) Accordingly, C’ can also be written as the sum of constant capital, 
variable capital, and the surplus-value generated. 
𝐶′ = 𝑐 + 𝑣 + 𝑠 
This incrementally increased commodity capital is then circulated (taken to market), to be 
realised through sales. The amount of new value L isn’t known before exchange takes place. 
In production, the individual capitalist can only estimate L – to what extent the labour 
expended correspond to the socially necessary labour-time – i.e. to what extent the 
productivity of his production process matches the social productivity-level – and to what 
degree his commodities corresponds to the monetary/payable demand. If the production 
process proves to be too inefficient and no demand exists for the produced use-values, then 
the commodities has no value, and the capitalist fail to realise the value-creating labour 
expended onto C’ (Heinrich 2012:51-55). Therefore, regardless, in the circulation process, 
the sum values of C’ realised are per definition equal to the incrementally increased sum of 
money (Freeman 1996:5). 
𝑀′ = 𝑀 + ∆𝑀 
𝑀′ = 𝑐 + 𝑣 + ∆𝑀 
∑𝑀′ = ∑𝐶′ 
And this incremental money-sum equals the total amount of surplus-value produced. 
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∑𝑠 = ∑∆𝑀 
Circulation while important for establishing the norms of what constitutes value-creating 
abstract labour (i.e. rendering the social/average productivity level palpable for individual 
firms), isn’t in itself a source of value, it merely circulates values. An individual capitalist 
may receive M’ that differ from their C’, since someone may sell goods worth more or less 
than the value of their C’, but this is merely a redistribution of the total value between 
capitalists, since total value is unaltered by exchange (Marx 1981:135; Freeman 1996:5; 
Heinrich 2012:147; see section 3.2.1.b). Furthermore, John Smithin argues that the only 
possibility for M’ to be greater than M is because money and credit creation must have taken 
place throughout the labour- and circulation process.  
… for profits to be “real” (not inflationary), 𝑀′ > 𝑀 must stimulate production, that 
is 𝐶′ > 𝐶 in “value” or “real” terms, to the same extent. If the quantity of 
commodities, C, stays constant, then 𝑀′ > 𝑀 will only mean a rise in money prices. 
(Smithin 2009:13) 
3.2 – The general law of accumulation & the tendency of the profit rate to fall 
Individual capitalists are on the one hand motivated by the extra profits gained by increasing 
productivity above the social average; on the other compelled by competition to raise their 
productivity in order to not get eliminated in the market arms-race.  
[Competition] forces individual producers to set prices with an eye on the market, just 
as it forces them continually try to cut costs so they can cut prices and expand market 
share. Cost-cutting can take place through wage reduction, increases in the length or 
intensity of the working day, and through technical change. The latter becomes the 
central means over the long run. (Shaikh 2016:259)  
Increasing productivity allow the capitalist to cut their costs and continue to sell their output 
at prices determined by the more cost-inefficient firms, thus, increasing their profit margin 
and likewise granting them a leeway to cut prices in order to force out rivals from the markets 
and gain market-shares. Therefore, there’s a bias towards labour-saving and capital-using 
technical change, or a higher organic composition of capital (Ω), which is the ratio of capital 
to labour-power (section 4.1.2). Increasing the organic composition of capital is an important 
measure for raising the productivity of labour-power and facilitates an increased rate of 
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surplus-value extraction from the workers by cheapening their means of subsistence (thereby 
the value of labour), the cost of raw materials, and machinery.  
Capital can accumulate under constant conditions, i.e. constant organic composition of capital 
and constant rate of exploitation s’, where the demand for labour-power grows proportionally 
with capital; a 20% growth of capital leading to a 20% growth of workers demanded. But the 
rising demand for labour-power usually brings about an improvement in workers bargaining 
position, thus leading to the price of labour-power to rise. This tends to diminish the rate of 
surplus-value, weaken competitive cost-advantage, and thus slow down accumulation, 
inciting the introduction of labour-saving machines into the labour process (Marx 1976:762-
772; Heinrich 2012:124-125). Therefore, the accumulation process typically takes place 
under an increasing composition of capital, where the demand for labour-power and wage-
rises are restrained by the accumulation process itself. Accumulation incorporates labour in a 
constantly diminishing proportion, i.e. in a relatively declining ratio to means of production. 
From accumulation, an industrial reserve army of workers – workers impelled to sell their 
labour-power but can’t easily find buyers – arise (Marx 1976:772-794). In other words, full-
employment isn’t brought about naturally by capitalism.  
3.2.1 – The law of the tendency of the profit rate to fall  
Capitalists, albeit interested in increasing the rate of surplus-value s’, don’t themselves 
measure profit in these terms, instead they measure it as surplus against the total capital 
advancements. 
𝑝′ =
𝑠
𝐶
 
Where 𝐶 = 𝑐 + 𝑣. On a macro-level, the total mass of profit equals the total amount of 
surplus-value(∑𝑠 = ∑∆𝑀); profit, therefore, is just another name for surplus-value (Marx 
1981:320). The profit rate is closely associated with both the rate of exploitation and the 
organic composition of capital, and can be rewritten as: 
𝑝′ =
𝑠
𝑐 + 𝑣
=
𝑠
𝑣
𝑐
𝑣 +
𝑣
𝑣
=
𝑠′
Ω + 1
 
The rate of exploitation s’ have a positive correlation to the profit rate p’, whereas to the 
organic composition of capital, p’ has a negative correlation. Meaning p’ increases/decreases 
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if s’ increases/decreases, while the reverse is the case with Ω; an increase/decrease in Ω leads 
to a decrease/increase in p’.  
Suppose we have a “closed” economy, where the rate of exploitation equals 100% (𝑠′ =
100
100
= 1), and the initial constant capital employed is 200, then the profit rate is 33% 
(𝑝′ =
100
200+100
= 0,33). Suppose further that the constant capital grows 10% every year, 
while surplus-value and variable capital remains the same (implying an increasing organic 
composition of capital) – the following pattern emerge: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: 
Illustration of the 
law of the tendency 
of the rate of profit 
to fall 
Author’s 
calculations. 
As apparent from this simple illustration, the rate of profit declines as the organic 
composition of capital rise, since relatively less living labour and thus relatively less surplus-
labour underpinning surplus-value, is absorbed by the total capital; the absolute magnitude of 
surplus-value may still increase. This is under assumptions of a constant value of labour (v), 
and a constant rate of surplus-value (s’).  
Several scholars have argued that Marx’s “law” isn’t rigorously worked out; an increase in 
organic composition of capital doesn’t necessarily lead to a decline in p’ as long as it 
facilitates a cheapening in the means of subsistence that determines the value of labour and 
subsequently an increase of in the rate of surplus-value s’ that outweighs the rise in Ω. 
Similarly, if increased productivity cheapens the elements of constant capital, Ω might 
remain stable or even see a decline (Heinrich 2012:152; Harvey 1982:177f). Robert Kurz 
argue that even if labour is devalued, the rate of surplus-value increased, and constant capital 
cheapened, this could still lead to a fall in the rate of profit, but not due to the growth of total 
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capital stock relative labour, but due to faltering demand, as increased productivity lead to not 
only cheapening products, but also a declining labour-share, creating difficulties in realising 
output, thus deteriorating new value-creation L, which leads to a decline in surplus-value. 
Figure 2 shows an example of productivity increases in a “closed” economy, referring to a 
single commodity or a “shopping basket” of arbitrary composition. Technological innovation 
increases productivity by 25%, i.e. reduces socially necessary labour-time (L) required for 
production by 20%. The shopping basket is also the means of subsistence determining the 
value of v. By implication the necessary paid labour (v) decreases by 36% by the combined 
effects of productivity increases and cheapened subsistence, effectively reducing the 
“demand-base”, but leading to a simultaneous increase in the rate of surplus-value (s’). Even 
though the rate of surplus-value is increasing, the total amount of surplus-value (s) declines 
as a side-effect of total value L decreasing (Ortlieb 2008:92ff). Since 𝐿 = 𝑣 + 𝑠, a reduction 
of socially necessary labour (L) – new value created – leads to a corresponding decrease in 
the total surplus-value, despite an increase in the share of s in L.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: 
Illustration of 
the tendency of 
productivity to 
accelerate and 
the consequent 
erosion of the 
demand-base 
Author’s 
calculations, 
based on Ortlieb 
(2008) 
In this simplified model “the rate of surplus value increases in direct proportion to 
productivity, and as long as the rate of surplus value remains below 1, the mass of surplus 
value also grows” (ibid:98).  
Therefore, the profit rate may decline not only because of a swollen stock of constant capital, 
but also because the value-creating labour is being diminished as productivity is increased. 
It’s increasing productivity – declining value of individual products, escalating material 
output, and labour-saving/wage-share depressing technical change – that brings forth the 
necessity of limitless capital accumulation on an increasingly larger scale (“economic 
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growth”) in order to compensate for the trends (demonstrated in figure 2) of continuous and 
successive erosion of the demand-base. For Kurz, the tendency of the profit rate to fall and 
overaccumulation is nothing but a surface phenomenon of this contradiction (Kurz 1986:47-
50). 
3.2.1.a – Consequences: the “law” as an indirect cause of crisis & depressions 
A healthy profit rate is important in order to spur investment and economic growth. 
Therefore, the law of the tendency of the profit rate to fall may perhaps not be a direct cause 
of crisis and depressions, but instead an indirect cause (Kliman 2011:14).  
Henryk Grossman writes that a declining rate of profit is “a permanent symptom of the 
progress of accumulation” in its normal functioning, and often “goes together with an 
expanding mass of profits [total surplus-value]” (Grossman 1992:u.a.). That is, the fall of the 
profit rate tend to lead to higher concentration of capital through mergers and acquisitions, 
since “a large amount of capital with a lower rate of profit accumulates more quickly than a 
small capital with a higher rate of profit” (Marx 1981:359). But when the fall in the profit rate 
isn’t outweighed by an increase of its mass, a “plethora of capital” emerge; whenever 
expanded capital investments only generates the same or less surplus-value as did before a 
lesser capital investment (when an investment of 𝑀 → 𝐶 + ∆𝐶 →  𝑀 ≤ 𝐶), there is an 
overaccumulation of capital, which likewise is an overproduction of commodities (Marx 
1981:359). Since this surplus capital emerges from the same process that creates a surplus 
population of labourers, a problem of realisation of commodities (hence imperfect 
valorisation of capital) emerges:  
Imperfect valorisation due to overaccumulation means that capital grows faster than 
the surplus value extortable from the given population, or that the working population 
is too small in relation to the swollen capital. (Grossman 1992:u.a.) 
Surplus capital appears alongside surplus population. As a consequence, the process breeds 
demand-problems as the given working population are incapable of valorising the excessive 
(overproduced) commodities spawned by the excess (overaccumulated) capital. In the face of 
a falling mass of labour-power, assuming the rate of surplus-value/exploitation isn’t 
increased, an absolute decline in the mass of profit (total surplus-value) follows (Marx 
1981:360). 
As capital hunts for steadily diminishing profitable outlets, the formation of idle surplus tends 
to channel into financial activity, inciting “speculation, credit swindles, share swindles, 
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crises” (Marx 1981:359-360). Therefore, low profit rates lead to a falling rate of capital 
accumulation, which in turn result in low growth rates of employment, output, income, and 
demand. Consequently, when income growth in the form of profit, wages, and tax revenue is 
slow, it’s more difficult for businesses, households, and governments to repay their debts. 
Additionally, when the rate of accumulation is low, interest rates will tend to be low as well 
(since decreasing investments implies less demand for credit), and this, in due time tend to 
make borrowing more attractive and subsequently encourage speculation in asset markets for 
bonds, stocks, and real estate – paving the way for a crisis-prone economy, potentially 
leading to long-term stagnation (Kliman 2011:18-19). Speculation and credit expansion 
creates options for workers and capitalists to borrow and spend more than they earn, 
subsequently solving the “realisation problem” (Roberts 2016:28). A drop in the profit rate, 
and more immediately, a fall in the mass of profit (total surplus-value), is often a preamble to 
a credit bubble bursting (ibid:93). As a result of the tendential fall of the profit rate spurring 
overaccumulation and overproduction, crisis ensues in abundance. 
3.2.1.b – Counteracting tendencies 
The “law of the tendential fall of the profit rate” isn’t a deterministic and linear process, but is 
constantly met with several counteracting tendencies. The profit rate falls unless the total 
surplus-value ∑s rises, but ∑s cannot exceed the value added, L, in any period; ∑𝑠 < 𝐿. If not 
proportionately more labour is employed as value-substance/demand-base to valorise capital, 
the profit rate will fall.  
Some of the counteracting tendencies, with regard to labour, are: (1) Increasing the 
magnitude of human endeavour L, and thus the production of absolute surplus-value by 
incorporating absolutely more workers, prolonging the working day and intensifying the 
labour process (Marx 1981:339f; see section 3.1.3). (2) Reduction of wages below their value 
(ibid:342) which is intricately intertwined with (3) the development of labour-productivity, 
and the subsequent creation of a surplus population of workers it brings about, diminishing 
wage-labourers bargaining position thus keeping them both cheap and quantitatively 
available (ibid:344). Both of the latter mentioned countertendencies imply a devaluation of 
labour by depressing or holding back the growth of v. 
With regard to constant capital, we encounter: (4) Cheapening of the elements of constant 
capital as a result of higher labour-productivity. Although the material volume of machines 
continually grows, this enhancement of productivity cheapens machinery and prevents the 
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value of c to grow, making it possible to employ more means of production to a lower capital 
value (ibid:343). Here Marx also mentions devaluation of existing capital. In particular, the 
tendency is interrupted and counteracted through the destruction of capital value that takes 
place during crises. This refers both to destruction of physical capital – machines and 
buildings that lay idle, rust, and deteriorate – as well as destruction of capital in terms of 
value – decline in the value of physical capital assets and decline in fictitious value of 
financial assets. However important destruction of physical assets can be, “the predominant 
factor that causes capital value to be destroyed is falling prices. As debt goes unpaid, the 
prices of financial assets such as mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities fall” 
(Kliman 2011:22). 
An often-overlooked countertendency is (5) the impact of increased turnover-speed; the 
advancements on circulating capitals (intermediate consumption and wages) return to the 
capitalist faster (through sales and the analogous spending of wage-earners and other 
capitalists purchasing inputs), than the outlays on fixed capitals, that takes years to amortise. 
The time-span it takes for capital outlays to be recuperated through sales is called turnover-
time, or n. This means that a capitalist just need to advance a small part of the yearly total 
wage bill and other outlays on intermediate consumption etc., since these costs tend to be 
recuperated by sales faster than investments in fixed assets; therefore the portion laid out on 
wages and raw materials is, due to its lower turnover-time, smaller, and can be decreased 
with increased turnover-speed; if all wages are spent during a month, the capitalists 
recuperates their original outlays for wages through those sales, and can thus be used to pay 
for the next month’s wages. Increased turnover-speed thus has a positive impact on the profit 
rate, since it can increase surplus-value when outlays on variable capital – as well as repress 
the organic composition of capital as the portion of circulating constant capital – decline 
(Marx 1978:369ff).  
One important contribution of the present study is to adjust for turnover-time; wages adjusted 
for turnover is argued to better reflect firms’ actual outlays on wages. Neglecting to take into 
account the turnover-speed of for example the wage bill, would seriously overestimate 
labour-costs; in core countries such as the U.S., Japan and the Netherlands, the wage bills 
exceed 50% of GDP, but due to the turnover-speed, the true annual labour-costs to the 
capitalists are just about 5% (Maito 2014a:12).  
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One crucial and under-theorised counteracting tendency is the role of (6) foreign trade, which 
can function to cheapen, by import, both the elements of constant capital and the necessary 
means of subsistence, and therefore raise the rate of surplus-value as the outlays on variable 
capital is reduced (Marx 1981:344-345). Furthermore, as previously mentioned (section 3.2), 
in competition, more capital-intensive (high-composition) firms (or national economies), 
often being the more efficient and cost-competitive capitals, will by virtue of their larger 
market-shares, capture a larger share of surplus/profit relative their less-efficient international 
competitors. Investors, driven by profitability, tend to accelerate investments into activities 
with higher profit rates, accelerating expansion of output and capacity in that industry or 
sector, “until their output begins to grow faster than their demand, at which point their prices 
and profit rates will begin to decline” (Shaikh 2016:263-270, quote from p.106).  
Foreign trade can also facilitate the fall in the profit rate by permitting an increase in the scale 
of production, which accelerates accumulation, therefore potentially accelerates the rise in c 
relative v, hence a fall in the profit rate (Marx 1981:345).  
Another counteracting tendency (7), as a way to solve crises of overaccumulation, is 
destruction of capital value, the prime examples being the Great Depression and World War 
II. Losses caused by devaluation of financial and physical assets, or the actual destruction of 
physical assets, can create conditions for new profitable investments and thus restore 
profitability. When a crisis or slump hits, and some capitalists close down, others take over 
the vacant economic space, subsequently expanding production by hiking capacity utilisation. 
The expanded production at higher capacity tends to generate employment effects. In 
addition, the new capitalists buy up the means of production, raw materials, semi-finished 
products, etc. of the bankrupt firms at deflated prices, and depreciation is increased as a result 
of the higher capacity utilisation (effectively reducing the value of the assets further). As a 
result, the organic composition of capital decreases as the numerator (c) is depressed and the 
denominator (v) expands, together with increased purchasing power of labour as employment 
rises, and rising profitability of capital, facilitating the realisation of output (Kliman 2011:3; 
Roberts 2016:17-18).  
3.2.2 – The Marxian notion of productivity 
When it comes to economic development, it’s common to regard each country as the smith of 
its own fortune, notwithstanding that domestic institutions and governance are important in 
providing an environment conductive to economic growth, it’s problematic to regard a 
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country in isolation, without taking into consideration the international environment which 
conditions each individual nation’s actions, providing limits as well as room for manoeuvre. 
Common sense tells us that a more productive capitalism is a more profitable one. This 
intuition is reinforced by the fact that on a micro-level this relationship always seems to hold: 
more technologically advanced firms are more profitable than backward ones. Productivity is 
then conceived as having a simple, obvious and unidirectional causal relationship to 
economic growth; productivity-enhancing rationalisations and investments of the magnitude 
of X undertaken, leads to economic growth Y. But to assume that the general profit rate would 
rise with economy-wide productivity increases is a logical error; a fallacy of composition – 
what holds for the parts doesn’t necessarily hold for the whole (Kliman 2011:15).  
On a macro-level increased organic composition of capital lead to a reduction in the general 
rate of profit, while on a micro-level a higher than average organic composition of capital 
implies an ability to retain a larger market-share, hence larger share of the total surplus-
value/profit produced (Kurz 1986:61).  
As mentioned in section 3.1, to what extent the privately expended labour counts as value-
creating depends on to what extent it corresponds to the average, or regulating productivity-
level, as well as fulfils a societal monetary demand. While the outlays on constant and 
variable capital are prima facie – given and known quantities – the new value created L, isn’t 
known before exchange, but can merely be estimated and is a reflection of competitiveness 
and market-shares. Since competition is a war waged with prices, a highly productive capital 
with cheaper goods will yield larger market-shares, thus capturing/absorbing more of the 
circulating monetary demand. With more commodities of a firm/nation being realised in 
circulation, more capital is valorised and a larger share of the total surplus-value produced in 
circulation is captured by the specific firm/nation. Hence, the correlation between 
productivity and growth is always possible to establish between firms, or between nations. 
But what happens when a general amplification of productivity occurs is quite another 
question. When sharp economy-wide competition compels capitalists to cheapen the real 
costs of commodities, augmented by investments in constant capital, while the share of wages 
is decreasing in total output as labour-saving machinery are introduced (and labour-devaluing 
politics are pursued) – thus generating realisation problems (or demand problems) – then the 
profit rate tends to trend downwards, with less investments, less output, and less employment 
as a result. What appears rational for individual firms, engender irrational aggregate results. 
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Furthermore, productivity in capitalism refers mainly to the “abstract process of the 
formation of value”, represented as exchange value, whose substance is abstract human 
labour (Kurz 1986:21). The only productive labour is the labour expended which contribute 
to this process of value-formation, while labour related to circulation-functions such as 
buying and selling (marketing, market analysis, advertising, financial intermediation, 
wholesale/retail trade, etc.) are no creator of value. Non-production-activities are dependent 
upon production-activities; the former circulate and facilitate the exchange of the latter. 
Without production, there would be no commodities to circulate, no entrepreneurial 
initiatives and development projects to finance, and no stream of revenue that could be taxed 
for setting up a social infrastructure. These functions and activities are necessary for the 
whole process, but are never really a part of the material labour process (ibid:23-25). If one is 
interested in the actual investment behaviour and realised profits of firms, one should focus 
on the “productive” sector (Kliman 2011:94f). 
3.3 – Previous research on the tendency of the profit rate to fall 
The literature on the law is extensive, but findings of recent papers suggesting that the law 
seem to be a general economic feature. Li, Xiao & Zhu notes there’s been several “long 
waves” in the movement of average profit rate and rate of accumulation since the mid-19th 
century. They especially point towards the drastic fall that followed in the transition from 
U.K. hegemony to U.S. hegemony, where the fall in profit rate is explained by a rising wage 
and taxation cost, i.e. a profit-squeeze theory (Li et al 2007). Esteban Maito, using a turnover-
adjusted method and a sample of fourteen countries,5 demonstrates a secular decline in “core 
countries” since the mid-19th century until the 2000s, and in “peripheral countries” since the 
1950s onward. His world-mean measure for the period 1950-2010 shows a trough in the 
beginning of the 1980s, followed by a somewhat stable profit rate (Maito 2014a). Michael 
Roberts (2016) general argument is that the financial crisis of 2008 was caused by the “law” 
and that the world-economy since that have been entering a long depression, with surplus 
capital incapable of being recycled through investments (i.e. overaccumulated capital). 
By looking at historical data on real labour-productivity and output-capital ratios, Marquetti 
investigates whether or not the tendency towards labour-saving and capital-using technical 
change is prevalent in a series of capitalist economies as well as the patterns of the worlds 
regions over time. A “Marx-biased technical change” – as opposed to Harrod-neutral (labour-
                                                          
5 His sample consists of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, China, Germany, Japan, Korea, Mexico, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, U.S.A., U.K. 
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saving but neither capital-saving nor capital-using) and Hicks-neutral technical change 
(equally labour- and capital-saving) – thus implies increasing real labour-productivity 
indicating labour-saving,6 and a declining output-capital ratio indicating capital-using 
(Marquetti 2002:192).  
Marquetti finds that the US, UK, Netherlands, Germany, France, and Japan all experience a 
labour-saving and capital-using pattern in general, albeit not universally for the whole period 
of 1820 and 1992 (ibid:193ff). For the world as a total (excluding the Middle-East due to the 
effects of oil prices in GDP) his regression seems to confirm this Marx-biased technical 
change, although the standard deviation is quite large relative the mean (ibid:197). In the 
regional analysis which stretches over the period of the 1960s or 1970s to 1990, the trends are 
quite differing. The regions of the U.S. & Canada, East Asia, South Asia and Eastern Europe 
demonstrate a Marx-biased technical change over the period, while Western Europe, 
Southern Europe, and Oceania demonstrate a labour-saving and capital-using pattern up until 
the 80s, when capital-using starts stagnating into constancy or a slight capital-saving. For 
North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America, the experience seems to be a Marx-
bias up until the middle of the 80s, followed by a reversal of the trend (ibid:197-198). 
3.3.1 – The case of the U.S. 
Andrew Kliman demonstrates that for the U.S., the profit rate started to fall, failing to 
rebound, after the slumps of the mid-1970s and early 1980s. Checking for inflation, the fall 
already started in the mid-1950s (Kliman 2011:77f). The persistent fall in profitability 
produced a fall in the rate of capital accumulation, leading to sluggish growth in per capita 
GDP, growth of corporations output, of compensations of employees, and rising debt burdens 
(ibid:89f). Kliman demonstrates that the slow growth of employment relative to the 
accumulation of fixed capital (i.e. an increasing organic composition of capital) accounts for 
the lion’s share of the fall in the nominal rate of profit in the post-war era, while the profit-
share remained pretty much constant over the period (ibid:130ff). Accompanying the ICT-
revolution, there’s been an increase in the rate of depreciation due to obsolescence. This 
increased rate of destruction of capital value is a mechanism that work to boost profitability, 
but despite that, the profit rate of the U.S. has seen a significant fall. Thus, when controlling 
for the increased rate of moral depreciation, the fall in the profit rate during the last few 
decades is even greater (ibid:141ff).  
                                                          
6 “industries with more rapid productivity growth tend to displace labor and show lower growth of hours” 
(Storm 2017:26). 
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Fred Moseley (1997) similarly argues for the secular decline in the rate of profit after the war, 
causing not only the stagflation of the 1970s, but profitability never fully recovered after that. 
He argues that one of the most important determinants of the fall in the profit rate has been 
the growing proportion of unproductive activities relative productive ones. If non-production 
labour performed increases faster than production labour performed, this will cause the profit 
rate to fall, since it implies increasing costs and less value-creation. Moseley notes that this 
increased ratio of unproductive to productive labour seem to be a consequence of 
technological change conductive to increasing productivity of production-activities more 
rapidly than that of the non-production-activities (Moseley 1997:7). 
One common way of measuring the profit rate, is by the ratio of surplus to capital. This profit 
rate can be decomposed into the product of the share of surplus in the output, multiplied with 
the ratio of output to the fixed capital stock (
𝑠
𝑐
=
𝑠
𝑦
∗
𝑦
𝑐
). The profit rate is “proportionately 
related to the surplus share and inversely related to the capital/output ratio” (Edvinsson 
2010b:481). Of these ratios – the profit share, and the output-capital ratio – the latter one is 
regarded to be the more important one influencing the profit rate. Alan Freeman (2009:8) 
found that for the U.S., the output-capital ratio explained 91.9% of the variations in the 
movements of the profit rate from 1929 to 1965, and 75.7% of the variation during the whole 
period of 1929 and 1996. 
3.3.2 – The case of Sweden 
In the case of Sweden, Rodney Edvinsson – decomposing the profit rate into the product of 
surplus-share times the output-capital ratio – suggests that there’s been a secular decline in 
the output-capital ratio during the course of Swedish capitalist development, implying a 
declining profit rate. This decline in the output-capital ratio continued up to the mid-1970s, 
after which it saw a rise, consequently leading to a rise in the rate of profit. He attributes 62% 
of the increase in the profit rate to an increasing surplus-share, while the remaining 38% is 
attributed to a declining output-capital ratio. This development is connected to the regime of 
flexible accumulation, where the slashing of the inventory stock relative the value added, was 
the main cause of the decline in the capital-output ratio (Edvinsson 2010b:479).  
4 – Methodology & data 
In this section, an operationalisation of the theory will first be presented, followed by remarks 
on the datasets, definitions of categories such as surplus, capital stock etc., and their linking. 
Alexander Wulff hek12awu@student.lu.se EKHS11 
24 
 
4.1 – Operationalisation & measurement 
The profit rate is related to the organic composition of capital, whose dynamic is in turn 
related to capital accumulation, which is governed by the rate of profit. These components are 
interrelated and part of one process, feeding and flowing into each other. Therefore, this 
subsection will deal with the rate of profit, the organic composition of capital, capital 
accumulation, and decomposing changes in the profit rate. 
4.1.1 – The profit rate 
Marx formula for measuring the rate of profit could also be formulated as the rate of 
exploitation/surplus-value, divided by the organic composition of capital plus one. 
𝑝′ =
𝑠
𝑐 + 𝑣
=
𝑠
𝑣
𝑐
𝑣 +
𝑣
𝑣
=
𝑠′
Ω + 1
 
This demonstrates the importance of the rate of exploitation/surplus-value, as well as Ω in 
determining the profit rate. In the present study, we will focus solely on the profit rate of 
“productive activities” (section 4.2.2). 
4.1.1.a – Adjusting for turnover-time 
The impact of the turnover-time of variable and circulating capital (intermediate 
consumption, raw materials) is crucial to take into account when measuring the rate of profit, 
since they have a great impact on the ratio.  
The formula proposed by Esteban Maito (2014a:3f) follows the Marxian formula – dividing 
net operating surplus (s) with the sum of fixed constant capital (cf), circulating constant 
capital (cc), and variable capital (v) – but where the size of the circulating capitals 
(intermediate consumption and wages) are adjusted, by division, for their turnover-speed (n).  
𝑝′ =  
𝑠
𝑐𝑓 +
𝑐𝑐
𝑛 +
𝑣
𝑛
 
Turnover-time is calculated in different ways in the literature, but in general it relates the 
costs and flows of sales to the inventory stock (Maito 2014a; Fichtenbaum 1988; Jones 
2017). Our method for calculating turnover-time is provided by Peter Jones (2017:89f), done 
in three steps. Firstly, we need to estimate the initial stock of variable capital advanced by 
multiplying the initial inventory stock with the share of compensation in output for the 
preceding year. 
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𝑣𝑡 =
𝑤𝑡−1
𝑦𝑡−1
∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑡 
Next, we measure the amount of variable capital realised during a year, vr, which in practice 
is likely to be the wages cost share of commodities sold during the period, or the share of 
wages in total output sold, multiplied with output less the change in inventories. 
𝑣𝑟𝑡+1 =
𝑤𝑡+1
𝑦𝑡+1
∗ (𝑦𝑡+1 − (𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑡+1 − 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑡)) 
Jones suggest one should also exclude the revaluation of the inventory stock when 
subtracting the change in inventory stock, but such an exclusion of the effect of revaluation 
has not been possible, which will impact the turnover-time some.  
From this we can, finally, calculate the turnover-time by dividing the realised variable capital 
to the preceding years advanced variable capital. 
𝑛𝑡+1 =
𝑣𝑟𝑡+1
𝑣𝑡
 
This can also be checked by an easier approximation of the turnover, similar to 
Fichtenbaum’s (1988:224) method, taking value added less the change in the inventory, 
divided by the total inventory stock. This measure can be used as a proxy for turnover-time, 
and in fact tends to follow the “proper” calculation closely (Jones 2017:90). 
𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 =
𝑦𝑡+1 − (𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑡+1 − 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑡)
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑡+1
 
The turnover-adjustment impacts on the basic categories of the profit-rate-equation: since 
total surplus-value is defined as output less consumption of fixed capital assets less variable 
capital (𝑠 = 𝑦 − 𝐶𝐹𝐶 − 𝑣), a turnover-adjusted variable capital implies a larger amount of 
surplus-value; an increase in the denominator of 
𝑣
𝑛
, leads to a decrease of the numerator, i.e. 
declining wage-outlays. This, in turn, translates into a larger amount of s, since the amount of 
v subtracted is lessened. This will in effect impact the rate of surplus-value (s’). The 
adjustment has the same diminishing effect on the circulating portion of constant capital 
(intermediate consumption). Therefore, the resulting ratios of the profit rate and organic 
composition of capital will also be affected. (See section 5.1.) 
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4.1.2 – The organic composition of capital & the accumulation of capital 
The rate of profit depends not only on the rate of surplus-value, but also on the proportions of 
productive constant capital to productive variable capital. The definition often referred to in 
the third volume read as follows: 
The organic composition of capital is the name we give to its value composition, in so 
far as it is determined by its technical composition and reflects it. (Marx 1981:245) 
This is quite an ambiguous definition of the concept. But could be simplified as the merely 
the ratio of capital to labour; the organic composition of capital is to be understood as “the 
ratio of the quantity of money constant capital advanced (affected by both the quantity and 
the value of the means of production) to the quantity of living labour set in motion (with 
variable capital as an index of this quantity of labour, on the assumption that wage rates are 
equal across industries” (Moseley 2016:347). Which gives the algebraically expression: 
Ω =
𝑐
𝑣∗
=
𝑐
𝐿
 
Where v* is an index for L. There is a crucial difference between the impact that changes in 
constant and variable capital has on the general rate of profit. Since constant capital merely 
transfers its value to the total societal product, it’s irrelevant whether a change in constant 
capital is due to changed monetary value of the means of production or a change in the 
physical quantity of the means of production. Whether or not a change in variable capital is 
due to a change in the number of workers, or in the wage rate, make all the difference in the 
world, since these have opposite effects on the rate of profit; more workers increase surplus-
value (due to more workers to exploit, and that create value), a higher wage rate decreases it. 
This is the reason why constant capital needn’t be an index for the physical quantity of the 
means of production, while it’s necessary for variable capital. By assuming that the wage rate 
is equal across industries, a change in the amount of variable capital will unambiguously 
represent a change in the labour employed. Variable capital has an organic relationship to the 
valorisation of the total capital – hence the organic composition of capital – while constant 
capital doesn’t have an organic relationship to the total capital due to its value-transferring 
function. Moseley also emphasise that the constant capital should be related to the value-
creating labour (Marx 1981:245; Moseley 2016:338,347-348).  
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Thus, we need to index v for the productive workforce Lp, by calculating average wage, and 
then multiply it with the productive workforce, so a change in v unambiguously represent a 
change in the productive workforce. 
𝑣 =
(
𝑊
𝑛 )
𝐿
∗ 𝐿𝑝 
Further, we’re interested in relating the constant capital (fixed and circulating) of production-
activities (c) in the economy – thus excluding the fixed assets pertaining to unproductive 
activities – to the productive workforce. The organic composition of capital is thus the total 
capital stock (K) less assets pertaining to non-production-activities (Ku), plus turnover-
adjusted intermediate consumption (IC) divided by the average wage of total labour 
multiplied with the number of production-workers. 
Ω =
𝑐
𝑣
=
(𝐾 − 𝐾𝑢) + (
𝐼𝐶
𝑛 )
(
𝑊
𝑛 )
𝐿 ∗ 𝐿𝑝
 
4.1.2.a – Indicators of a “Marx-biased” technical change in the course of accumulation 
The definition, or “fundamental law of accumulation” (Freeman 1996:7) is investment 
oriented towards expanding the capital stock. Accumulation is commonly measures as the 
ratio of investments to surplus (
𝐼
𝑠
) (Kliman 2011:90-92). But since accumulation isn’t 
reducible to the capital fixated in assets within the nation, but also flows through trade 
(exports, foreign direct investments, etc.), it’s also important to take into consideration the 
extent of foreign trade.  
Since Marx’s theory of accumulation and the consequent tendential fall of the profit rate 
predicts that technical change will have a bias towards labour-saving and capital-using, this 
can be addressed by measuring the nominal output-capital ratio and real labour-productivity. 
The latter measure is nominal figures deflated by the volume indices provided by the national 
accounts of SCB. We will expect the ratio of constant capital to output to increase over time 
(i.e. the output-capital ratio [
𝑦
𝑐
] to decrease) as an indication of rising organic composition of 
capital, while labour-productivity is expected to increase as an indication of labour-saving 
technical change.  
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4.2 – Remarks on the datasets & discussion of definitions 
Two data-sources will be used in the construction of a linked series. The first source will be 
Rodney Edvinsson’s time-series, which stretches from 1800 to 2000, and are based on the 
Swedish Historical Naitonal Accounts (SHNA) compiled by Olle Krantz and Lennart Schön 
for the period before 1950. All Edvinsson’s data are especially adjusted to the SCB time-
series of 1980-1995. The second source will be time-series from the Swedish Statistical 
Central Bureau (SCB) for the period 1993-2014. This mainly concerns series of produced 
fixed assets, wages and social benefits,  
Besides this we will, whenever possible, use available and coherent data series for the 
postwar period from the SCB. Especially when calculating real labour productivity, thus 
avoiding complications that may arise when mixing series deflated with volume indices that 
may differ.  
4.2.1 – Linking of datasets 
In the present study, where the focus is the post-war era (1946-2014), the series of Edvinsson 
need to be supplemented with additional data from the Swedish Statistical Central Bureau 
(SCB) for the period after 2000, of which the SCB-data partly overlaps, extending from 
1993-2016. The SCB-dataset is linked to the price level of Edvinsson’s dataset, where the 
latter dataset’s levels are prolonged or extrapolated forward onto the subsequent period, 
according to: 
𝐵𝑡+1
𝐵𝑡
∗ 𝐴𝑡. B signifies the SCB-series stretching from 1993-2016, and A denotes 
the historical national accounts, t is the base-year (or year of linking) of1993.  
The datasets aren’t fully coherent in their construction and definitions, which will give rise to 
differences in terms of values. The linking will alter the values of the SCB-data after 1993, 
although the trend will remain the same.  
The datasets differ in several aspects. For example, with the adaptation of the Swedish 
national accounts to the 1995 version of the European System of Accounts (ESA), equipment 
with a lifespan of under three years, such as immaterial assets and computer software, are no 
longer regarded as intermediate consumption, but part of the capital stock (SCB 2013:29), 
which means that these should be subtracted for full compatibility between Edvinsson’s 
dataset and SCB’s dataset. But such an adjustment has not been made, which will affect the 
aggregates. Since 2010 an update of the Swedish national accounts was made in accordance 
with the 2010 version of the ESA, “Research & Development” is no longer a part of fixed 
gross investments, but is instead filed under intermediate consumption (SCB 2013:25). This 
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latter change has the effect of raising the GDP level about 4% compared to previous system 
of accounting. Coupled with other overviews and new ways of calculating, the overall GDP 
level is raised 5% (SCB 2014:18f).  
Both Edvinsson and SCB calculates the capital stock according to the Perpetual Inventory 
Method, which add yearly investments to the capital stock of previous year. A geometrical 
depreciation rate – the asset is depreciated by a fixed value of its value in the previous year – 
is utilised in both series, and their series are relatively compatible, argues Edvinsson 
(Edvinsson 2005:107; SCB 2016:29). Since data is lacking for the capital stock for the last 
two years (2015 and 2016), and there’s no possibility to add net investments and reflate those 
to replacement costs, I have merely expanded the capital stock from 2014 to 2016 with the 
annual percentage growth rate of the capital stock in 1993-2014. 
Since Edvinsson constructed his dataset, there have been several changes in sectoral 
classification (SCB 2011), but these won’t affect the aggregates of the present study, since 
the reclassified activities merely just been transferred from one productive activity to another 
or from one unproductive activity to another.  
4.2.2 – Defining productive and unproductive economic activity 
For the present study, we will focus on the productive activities – regarding employment, 
compensation, produced assets, and output. There isn’t one “true” measurement of profit, but 
depends on what is under scrutiny and what questions are posed. If our interests concern the 
historical performance of an economy, and actual investment behaviour and realised profits 
of companies, such a “narrow” measure on the “productive” branches of the economy would 
be proper; meaning excluding unproductive activities, workers, compensation and assets.  
Pertaining to the value-creating productive (or production) activities are the labourers and 
assets (including depreciation on related assets) utilised in capitalistic production for the 
creation of use-values – goods or services – such as commodity-producing industry, 
agriculture, non-residential construction, transportation services, communication services. 
Among to the surplus-absorbing unproductive (or non-production) activities are the labour 
and assets involved in wholesale/retail trade, real estate, financial intermediation, 
advertisement, legal and civil services, and private and governmental reproductive services 
such as restaurants, hotels, education and health services, R&D, non-governmental 
associations, household services and other personal services (Shaikh & Tonak 1994:20-29; 
Kliman 2011:94,99; Roberts 2016:273-276). The latter activities are “supported” by the 
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former activities, which make out the base for value-creation. This isn’t to say that these 
activities aren’t materially valuable for the sustainment of the economy, but rather that they 
are unproductive with regard to value-formation (section 3.2.2).  
The category of surplus-value comes close to the definition of “productive” activities, being 
based on output-data from the most of aforementioned branches. Although some activities 
which are usually considered as non-production maintenance (garbage disposal, repairs etc.) 
are included in this category. Furthermore, all state activities aren’t necessarily considered 
unproductive with regard to value-formation, but since neither Edvinsson’s or SCB’s national 
accounts are disaggregated enough to make such distinctions, the choice was to exclude the 
public sector altogether. 
Due to the lack of sectoral disaggregation over the capital stock of Edvinsson’s dataset – with 
produced assets being categorised after type of asset – the capital stock of the private sector 
will be taken as the “productive” capital stock, thus including the assets pertaining to private 
reproductive services and circulation. Consequently, the “unproductive” capital stock will 
only consist of governmental and residential assets, which understate the amount of 
unproductive assets in the economy, and correspondingly overstate the amount of productive 
assets. This will affect the measures of profit and organic composition of capital for the 
productive sectors, effectively overstating the productive sectors organic composition of 
capital, as well as understating the rate of profit. For the period 1993-2014, which we have 
sectoral disaggregated data, the composition of capital is overstated by between 20-46%, 
while the profit rate is understated by about 20-27% (see appendix table 1). With regards to 
the trends of change in profitability and composition of capital, this doesn’t seem to matter 
much, with the “proper” measures demonstrating the same general trends as the aggregate 
economy-wide measure. Fortunately, the latter mentioned aggregated general rate of profit 
won’t be affected at all by this, since the weight of the non-production sectors are included in 
the calculations, although the share of non-production assets in the decomposition will he 
understated (see further section 4.1.2.a).  
4.2.3 – Valuating the capital stock at historical cost or at replacement cost 
Of great impact on the measurement of the rate of profit is whether the capital stock is valued 
at historical costs or current costs. The historical cost method values the goods and assets 
intended for production at the prices at which they were purchased, while the replacement (or 
current) cost value the capital stock at the prices at which they could be purchased in the 
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market currently. These measurements respond differently to inflation/disinflation; “during 
periods of inflation in the price of capital goods, historical cost profit rates will fall by less (or 
rise by more) than the corresponding replacement cost profit rates; during periods of 
disinflation, the opposite will be true” (Basu 2012:2). 
Kliman is a strong proponent for measuring the profit rate by the historical-cost estimated 
capital stock, and argues that the current-cost rate of profit is, in fact, not a measure of profit. 
He gives several reasons for this, amongst some of the most important ones for this study are: 
1. businesses and investors don’t base their investment decisions on such measures of 
profitability; 
2. since it revalues past investment, it fails to measure businesses’ and investors actual 
rates of return – profits as a percentage of the original investment;  
3. while the rate of profit is important when assessing the rate of accumulation, the 
current-cost measure doesn’t bear any clear relationship to the rate of accumulation;  
4. inflation distorts the measure, since current-cost measures are replacement-cost 
measures – i.e. it measures the cost of replacing the entire current stock of capital 
assets, and not changes in the cost of the actual capital assets acquired (Kliman 
2011:114-119). 
In opposition to Kliman, Moseley argues that the current-cost valuation is the correct way of 
measurement when assessing dynamic issues such as the falling rate of profit. According to 
Moseley, the constant capital being transferred is determined by the social average of the 
transferred constant capital pertaining to a specific commodity-class, and not the transferred 
constant capital of the individual company; meaning, if that social average changes for a 
commodity-class during the process of production, then the given constant capital being 
transferred will also change, or be revalued to the level “currently” prevalent at the time 
when the output is sold (Moseley 2016:287,304).  
In practice, choice of measurement makes minor difference. Several authors have 
demonstrated that the different cost-accounting techniques nevertheless display similar 
trends, albeit on different levels (Robert 2011; 206; Basu 2012). While I regard the historical-
cost technique to be more proper when measuring “actual” profit rates, the present study is 
forced into agnosticism as of which way is the “right” way, since replacement-cost valuation 
of the capital stock is common praxis when constructing national accounts. This is the case 
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with the national accounts compiled by Edvinsson (2005:102) as well as the data retrieved 
from SCB (2014:29).  
4.2.4 – Nominal terms or real terms? 
It could be beneficial to measure the rate of profit in nominal terms for several reasons. 
Volume and nominal price ratios can substantially differ from each other since the price 
indices of private consumption, output and capital goods develop differently. Furthermore, 
the nominal ratios are the basis of economic decisions (Edvinsson 2010b: 472), since 
businesses don’t only use their profits to buy goods and services:  
If that were the only use of profits, it wouldn’t matter how much nominal profit they 
bring in. All that would matter is the quantity of goods and services that the profit can 
buy, that is, inflation-adjusted profit. But businesses also use – and need – profit in 
order to repay their debts and pay taxes, and so the level of nominal profit is 
important. (Kliman 2011:95) 
But a nominal profit rate isn’t an “all-purpose index” if one is interested in assessing the 
“health of the economy”. Such cases justify measures adjusted for changes in the price level, 
for example real labour-productivity and real GDP growth, in addition to nominal rates. 
4.2.5 – Definitions of fundamental categories 
Surplus-value (s): is defined as GDP by activity (value added), at basic prices,7 less 
consumption of fixed capital assets less variable capital. The category is very similar to net 
operative surplus, which is GDP by activity less CFC less total compensation (of non-
production as well as production-workers).  
Variable capital (v): is defined as compensation paid out to production-activities, calculated 
as the average compensation (wages plus social benefits), multiplied by the number of 
employed involved in productive activities. (Productive/production labour is defined as 
employed involved in commodity-producing activities, such as agriculture, forestry, mining, 
manufacturing and handicrafts, as well as non-residential construction work. It also includes 
employed in transportation services, as well as information- and communication activities.) 
                                                          
7 GDP by activity at basic prices refers to value added where non-commodity-related indirect taxes are included, 
and non-commodity-related subsidies are excluded. Additionally, commodity-related indirect taxes are excluded 
and commodity-related subsidies included. Even though a large part of value added goes to paying taxes, most 
of them are redistributed back to the private sector in one way or another; to the workers through social benefits 
and welfare services; through maintenance of infrastructure and other services; to uphold a judiciary and 
policing system; and in the form of subsidies to companies (Edvisson 2005:54). 
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This indexes compensation for the number of employed, so a change in v unambiguously 
indicates a change in number of employed. In addition, it’s also divided by the turnover-time, 
so as to reflect the speed of which the outlays on wages return to firms through sales.  
Productive constant capital (c): due to the lack of data of fixed assets disaggregated on a 
sectoral basis, non-production constant capital is taken to be residential and governmental 
assets. The constant capital pertaining to production-activities is thus taken to be the total 
private sector capital stock, which includes certain assets pertaining to non-production-
activities, such as private reproductive services and circulation.  
5 – Analysis & historical contextualisation 
The final part contains remarks on how the turnover-adjustment impact upon the fundamental 
categories, as well as a presentation of the results for the two hypotheses, followed by a 
closer analysis of the different phases of the profit rate movement and secular stagnation, 
with reference to the developments in Swedish political economy. 
5.1 – Some remarks on the impact of the turnover-adjustment on the fundamental 
categories of the profit rate equation 
The turnover-adjustment will impact upon all the basic categories of the profit rate equation. 
As is evident from figure 3, both measures of turnover, n and nproxy, give similar trends, 
showing a radical increase during the 1970s, from having seen periods of general deceleration 
(with phases of stability) over the period 1850-1970. This coincided with the transition to so-
called post-fordist production. Between 1991 and 2008 the turnover-speed seems to stagnate, 
just to accelerate again thereafter. 
Furthermore figure 4 shows that the turnover-adjusted share of total labour-compensation in 
the total value added is markedly lower than the simple non-turnover-adjusted share; the 
turnover-adjusted compensation-share paid out increases slowly until the mid-1970s, after 
which it sees a marked decline to a marginal 10% share of a couple of percentage points of 
total value added at the turn of the century. Intermediate consumption of raw materials and 
other inputs as share of output are affected in a similar fashion, where an increase in 
turnover-speed reduces the capital advanced on inputs to a mere 8% in 2014 (figure 5). Since 
net operating surplus is attained by subtracting depreciation and compensation paid out to 
employees, a turnover-adjustment which reduces the size of compensation effectively shifts 
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the surplus-share in total output upwards, making out 70-90% of total output throughout the 
period (figure 6).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Turnover 
time 
Sources: Based on 
inventory stock and 
output data from 
Edvinsson (2005) 
up until 1993, and 
from SCB (2016) 
for 1994-2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Labour-
share, adjusted and 
non-adjusted for 
turnover 
Sources: 
Compensation and 
output data for 
1850-1993 from 
Edvinsson (2005), 
and for 1994-2016, 
from SCB (2016). 
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Figure 5: Share of 
intermediate 
consumption, 
adjusted and non-
adjusted for 
turnover 
Sources: 
Intermediate 
consumption and 
output data for 
1850-1993 from 
Edvinsson (2005) 
and for 1994-2016 
from SCB (2016). 
 
 
Figure 6: Surplus-
share, adjusted and 
non-adjusted for 
turnover 
Sources: Surplus 
calculated 
according to 
definition in 
section 4.2.5, based 
on output, 
depreciation and 
compensation data 
for 1850-1993 
from Edvinsson 
(2005) and for 
1994-2016 from 
SCB (2016). 
5.2 – Presenting the results for hypothesis #1 
When evaluating the support for hypothesis #1 – if Sweden is experiencing a long-term 
secular decline in its general profit rate – the trends displayed in figure 7 supports the theory. 
The rate of profit decline secularly, attaining periods of relative stability (from the end of the 
1870s, to the end of the 1910s; from the 1920s to the middle of the 1950s). The steady 
decline during the “golden industrial era” of 1950-1977 might come as a surprise, but it’s also 
important to note that this needn’t be a contradiction; the profit rate only measures the 
relative ratio of surplus to constant and variable capital, and doesn’t concern itself with the 
absolute magnitude of surplus-value. A larger capital accumulating under a lower profit rate 
accumulates faster than a smaller capital with a higher profit rate. And this era was also one 
of comprehensive concentration of ownership and formation of large companies within 
Sweden (see section 5.4.1). 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1
8
5
0
1
8
5
6
1
8
6
2
1
8
6
8
1
8
7
4
1
8
8
0
1
8
8
6
1
8
9
2
1
8
9
8
1
9
0
4
1
9
1
0
1
9
1
6
1
9
2
2
1
9
2
8
1
9
3
4
1
9
4
0
1
9
4
6
1
9
5
2
1
9
5
8
1
9
6
4
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
6
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
4
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
6
2
0
1
2
Share of intermediate consumption in total value added 
(in %), turnover-adjusted vs. simple measure
Intermediate consumption in output (n-adj.), in %
Intermediate consumption in output (non-n-adj.), in %
0
20
40
60
80
100
1
8
5
0
1
8
5
6
1
8
6
2
1
8
6
8
1
8
7
4
1
8
8
0
1
8
8
6
1
8
9
2
1
8
9
8
1
9
0
4
1
9
1
0
1
9
1
6
1
9
2
2
1
9
2
8
1
9
3
4
1
9
4
0
1
9
4
6
1
9
5
2
1
9
5
8
1
9
6
4
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
6
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
4
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
6
2
0
1
2
Surplus-share in total value added (in %), turnover-
adjusted vs. simple measure
Net operative surplus in output (n-adj.), in %
Net operative surplus in output (non-n-adj.), in %
Alexander Wulff hek12awu@student.lu.se EKHS11 
36 
 
Perhaps most curiously is the surge of the profit rate from the end of the 1970s to mid-1990s, 
after which it declines once again. Compared to the historical trend, this bump in the profit 
rate is quite extraordinary. Although it trends downwards again post-1995, reaching levels in 
2016 akin to the levels of the beginning of the 1980s. The periodisation fits quite well with 
Schön’s periodisation of transformation (up until 1990/95) and rationalisation post-1995, 
with increased productivity (section 5.5) and competition pulling the profit rate down.  
5.3 – Presenting the results for hypothesis #2 
The results largely support hypothesis #2 – whether or not Sweden demonstrates a Marx-
biased technical change, which is capital-using and labour-saving technical change.  
The fall in the profit rate is very much mirrored by the build-up of the capital stock, measured 
as produced fixed assets to total value added. Figure 8 shows that, over the long-term, there’s 
an increasing capital stock relative the total output generated (i.e. capital-using tendency). 
Furthermore, figure 8 suggests there’s been several “waves” in the growth of the capital 
stock; the first wave initiated in the beginning of the 1870s, after which it keeps a fairly stable 
rate to the total output, up until around the break-out of the first world war, when the stock of 
produced assets once again expand, with a third wave of asset expansion following in the 
wake of the second world war. The increases in capital stock correlates well with the waves 
of machinery-cheapening, with a reduction in relative prices of machinery leading to an 
increase in the stock of produced assets (Schön 2009:6). But the beginning of the 1980s 
signals a break: for an extended period, the capital stock actually declined up until the middle 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Long-term 
profit rate trend, 
1850-2016 
Sources: Based on 
output, capital stock 
and compensation 
data for 1850-1993 
from Edvinsson 
(2005), and for 
1994-2016 from 
SCB (2016). 
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of the 1990s – perhaps being the effect of cheaper capital costs associated with “third 
industrial revolution” – after which it starts increasing once again.  
Furthermore, the figure also reveals an increased gap between total and private sector stock 
of assets, the difference making out governmental and residential assets, the latter two 
absorbing an increasingly larger share of the total produced assets.  
But I argue that the output-capital ratio isn’t necessarily an accurate or at least not 
unproblematic measure of capital-using technical change (i.e. increasing organic composition 
of capital). The critical notion of productivity outlined in section 3.2.2 encompasses also the 
output-capital ratio. While increasing capital-productivity (increasing output per unit capital) 
is interpreted as a capital-saving tendency, the opposite might be the case; the increasing 
capital-productivity might be the result of an increasing organic composition of capital, with 
an increased use of fixed capital augmenting the production process, rendering it more 
competitive. A more efficient capital with enhanced material productive capacity, lower 
production-costs, and cheaper constant capital (or other “zero-cost” effects, section 2), will 
by implication, enjoy larger market-shares, therefore more abled to realise more output.8  
As figure 9 suggests, the trends in real labour-productivity as well as the organic composition 
of capital – classically measured as the monetary quantity of means of production relative 
variable capital indexed for the number of employed – conform quite well with the theory; a 
secular increase in real labour-productivity implying labour-saving technical change, and a 
                                                          
8 Schön, measuring the output-capital ratio in real terms, indeed demonstrates a secularly capital-using pattern, 
with generally similar waves as the ones demonstrated in figure 8, with the big exception of the trend during the 
1980s onwards not exhibiting a decline, but instead remains relatively stable (Schön 2009:6). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Stock of 
constant capital, 
1850-2016 
Sources: Capital 
stock and output 
data for 1850-1993 
from Edvinsson 
(2005), and for 
1994-2016 from 
SCB (2016). 18
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strongly upward trending organic composition of capital, taking off during the 1970s 
(contrary to the evidence of capital-saving in figure 8). The increase in Ω is an idiosyncrasy 
of late capitalism, from 1850 to 1970 accumulation have tended to proceed during a generally 
constant composition of capital, with outlays on constant and variable capital exhibiting a 
balanced growth. So, while the capital stock undoubtedly grown throughout the late 19th and 
20th century, and labour-productivity likewise, the accumulation process has tended toward 
having comprehensive employment effects – with unemployment only attaining marginal 
levels of around 2% from the Great Depression up until 1991 (when unemployment 
skyrocketed) – retarding any drastic increase in organic composition of capital throughout 
large parts of the 20th century. This was mainly the hallmark of the full-employment policies 
of the Bretton Woods-backed Swedish Model (see section 5.4.1).  
To summarise, however measured, there is indeed a pattern for what we might call a Marx-
biased technical change.  
5.4 – Historical narration of the movements in the profit rate 
When taking into consideration of the turnover-time of variable capital, then wage-costs and 
social benefits should make out a lesser amount of total expenditures (as already shown in 
figure 4), with expenditures on (especially fixed) constant capital making out the primary 
outlays. It follows that the main driver of the fall in the profit rate should be the increasing 
organic composition of capital. Figure 10 below show the development of the share of 
surplus and variable capital in total new value L, over the course of 1946-2016.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Marx-
biased technical 
change, 1950-2015 
Sources: Real GDP 
for 1950-2015 from 
SCB (2016); Capital 
stock, compensation 
data and worked 
hours for 1950-1993 
from Edvinsson 
(2005), and for 
1994-2015 from 
SCB (2016; 2017). 
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The shares between surplus and variable capital experienced a quite bumpy development 
from the late 1960s and 1970s, indicative of the many wage-hikes and devaluations of the 
period. From the late 1970s something radical happens, as the v-share drops in light-speed 
velocity to a level of 10-13%, which it keeps gravitating around until 2016 – and the surplus-
share swells accordingly, gaining a fat 87-90% of new value in 1989-2016. Perhaps the fall in 
profitability preceding the 1980s could be argued to be one of a profit squeeze by an 
increasing share of labour-costs, rising from ca 30% to ca 40% in 1946-1978. But from then 
on, the outlays on variable capital makes out a successively declining share of total 
expenditures, which rules out subsequent falls in the profit rate (post-1995) to be due to any 
“excessive” wage-demands from workers.  
Upon closer examination of the constituent parts of the profit equation, we see (in table 1) 
that the ratios exhibit different phases of covariance. For the whole period of 1946-2016, the 
p’ exhibits a falling tendency, and Ω an increasing trend. In the next three sections, a more 
thorough analysis of the specific periods will follow, with reference to table 1, 
accommodating the developmental trends of the variables with the political-economic history 
of Sweden. 
Table 1: Annual percentage change in basic categories of the profit rate equation9 
Periods p' s' (s/v) Ω (c/v) v cc cf n 
1946-2016 -0.74 1.61 2.47 5.03 5.90 7.87 1.35 
1946-1977 -1.90 -0.92 1.08 8.84 9.57 10.12 -0.51 
1977-1995 3.64 9.29 5.30 0.43 2.59 6.73 5.56 
1995-2016 -2.12 0.71 2.98 2.24 2.23 5.67 1.44 
                                                          
9 See appendix table 2 for data-series. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Share of 
surplus and 
variable capital in 
value added 
Sources: Based on 
output, depreciation 
and compensation 
data (turnover-
adjusted) from 
Edvinsson (2005) 
for 1946-1993, and 
from SCB (2016) 
for 1994-2016.  
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* Sum of last three years divided by sum of first three years, discounted by number 
of years. 
p’ – rate of profit 
s’ – rate of surplus-value/exploitation 
Ω – organic composition of capital 
v – variable capital 
cc – circulating constant capital 
cf – fixed constant capital 
n – turnover-speed 
 
5.4.1 – Stagger & fall: the transience of the Swedish Model 
What underlying developments – political and economic – worked to bring the rate of profit 
down between 1946 and 1977, bringing an end to the industrial golden age? 
The period of the 1940s to 70s is usually referred to as a part of the industrial golden age for 
Sweden, and the maturation of the “Swedish Model” – a construct very much associated with 
the Bretton Woods System and Fordism. The Bretton Woods System – of pegged but 
adjustable exchange rates to eliminate balance-of-payments deficits, and capital controls to 
insulate countries from destabilizing capital flows (which was necessary to make the pegged 
exchange rates feasible) – made possible national policies oriented towards full-employment, 
job security, collective wage-bargaining, tax and income policies that kept inequality at bay, 
state control of key industries, and Keynesian pro-cyclical policies (Eichengreen 1996:93ff; 
Harvey 2005:19f; Streeck 2014:28f). Following decades of harsh conflict, a spirit of 
consensus was eventually nurtured between the unions represented in the Swedish Trade 
Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen, LO), and the Swedish Employers’ Confederation 
(Svensk Arbetsgivarförening, SAF10), with the Saltsjöbaden agreement reached in 1938. The 
confederations acknowledged the importance of economic growth and productivity-raising 
measures. Collaborations like these became necessary, partly due to the stronger bargaining 
position of the trade unions which employers couldn’t ignore. Out of the spirit of consensus 
grew (among other institutions) the system of centralised and collective bargaining for wage-
settlement between the parts of the labour-markets, thus excluding the government from 
intervening in wage-settlements. Cooperation came to be seen as a way of avoiding labour-
market conflicts and economic imbalances (Lundh 2010:181f). 
                                                          
10 SAF would later – through a merge with the Federation of Swedish Industry – be replaced with the 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (Svenskt Näringsliv, SN), as the most important confederation representing 
the interests of employers. 
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Within the framework of this system of collective bargaining a wage-policy aimed at 
reducing wage gaps between different occupations and sectors was pursued, with wages 
being set in relation to the wage-leading sector (the most competitive-pressured sector). LO 
was willing to pursue the objective of moderating the wage-demands order to inhibit 
inflation, while SAF wanted to stifle competition between the firms of their affiliates over a 
short labour-supply, to prevent it from leading to rising wage-costs (Lundh 2010:195ff). A 
collectively defined wage benefited the big export-oriented companies, since it would inhibit 
wage-demands in their sectors, thus raising their competitiveness (ibid:217f). The system also 
facilitated the consolidation of large companies, as wage-costs effectively was raised in the 
less expansive sectors’, successively weeding them out, augmenting structural change, 
rationalisation and expansion (ibid:213f). 
Expansionary politics – inspired by Keynesian ideas of demand-stimulation – was commonly 
practiced in most countries. However, the central problem for Sweden in the postwar era 
wasn’t faltering demand, but rather to strike a balance between on the one hand monetary- 
and price stability, with full-employment on the other. The weeding-out of unprofitable firms 
and restraining excessive wage-demands retarded demand, and curbed inflation somewhat. 
The main method wasn’t to stimulate demand, but rather to hold back; although the 
“Keynesian idea” of expanding demand during recessions and reducing demand during 
booms, remained a general guiding principle throughout the period (Magnusson 2016:407f).  
Furthermore, the Swedish Model was very much connected to a movement of rationalisation 
associated with ideas of Frederick Taylor and Henry Ford, which aimed to increase efficiency 
and reduce unit-costs. Mechanisation was extended, division of labour was increased, and 
labour processes were simplified. With time production became more machine-driven and 
automated, work tasks were specialised and simplified so non-skilled workers could handle 
the machines, and production were focused on mass production on a large scale of 
standardised commodities. Under supervision of a hierarchical organisation, productivity 
increased radically (Lundh 2010:156ff). 
During the period, table 1 above suggests that Ω increased slightly, while s’ exhibits a 
negative rate of change, resultantly p’ falls; the components of constant capital – circulating 
and fixed – grew rapidly during this era (9.57 and 10.12% respectively) – indicative of the 
heavy industrialisation taking place – while at the same time exhibiting low unemployment, 
and a yearly growth rate of variable capital of 8.84%, above the 5.03% average for the entire 
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period, 1946-2016 – symptomatic of the full-employment policies backed up by the strong 
bargaining position of labour pushing for increases in wages and social benefits, 
consequently acquiring a larger share of the new value produced (and reducing the rate of 
exploitation).  The fall of the profit rate seemingly reflected a “squeeze” of surplus between 
on the one hand an increasing organic composition of capital, on the other of labours 
increasing wage-demands. The reason the profit rate could fall for such an extended period of 
time is probably because of the counteracting effect that the absolute increase of the mass of 
profits (total surplus-value) that concentration of capital implied, as a side-effect of the 
weeding-out of smaller and uncompetitive firms, to the benefit of larger owners.  
During the 1960s, Swedish industry was in deep crisis: large deficits in its current account 
amounted, as an expression of its declining competitiveness; industry stopped expanding. 
Competition tightened successively during the postwar era due to the gradual spread of the 
Industrial Revolution to the developing world – their share of world manufacturing output 
nearly doubled from 12% to 20%, while industrialized countries’ share fell accordingly in 
1970-1995. The tightening competition was felt in Sweden already during the 1960s and 70s, 
especially within shipbuilding as Japan modernised production technologies and kept labour-
costs low, but also from Newly Industrialised Countries which heightened competition within 
labour-intensive production lines such as electronics. Another competitive pressure arose 
from the restoration of previously war-torn Europe, with updated technological levels 
(Findlay & O’Rourke 2007:513; Lundh 2010:233f). The problems facing the Swedish 
economy was to the core a result of declining profitability as firms were rendered 
successively uncompetitive, resulting in waning accumulation as domestic investment as 
share of surplus dropped (figure 11 below). These structural problems would soon come to 
the fore as capital controls eroded and the with the incipient stagflation crisis of the 1970s. 
The Bretton Woods System became harder to sustain, as tariffs, quantitative restrictions and 
capital controls were unravelling on a global scale. After 1959, international capital markets 
started to find ways around rich countries’ capital controls, as it became easier to channel 
capital transactions through the current account by over- and under-invoicing imports and 
exports; “it became difficult to distinguish and segregate purchases and sales of foreign 
currency related to transactions on current and capital accounts” (Eichengreen 1996:93ff, 
quote from p.136). The erosion of capital controls made adjustments to the pegged exchange 
rate unviable, since every hint from governments and central banks to adjust the peg could 
stir massive capital outflow (although Sweden would retain its regime of fixed exchange rates 
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until 1992). The ongoing development on financial markets, propelled by 
telecommunications and information-processing technology, with competing financial centers 
emerging, made liberalization and a transition to floating exchange rates imperative in order 
not to lose one’s financial business to offshore markets, or being passed over by foreign 
investors (ibid:136-137).  
The death blow would come from the OPEC oil embargo in conjunction with the Arab-Israeli 
war, and the resultant hiking of oil prices, generating a supply shock that would instigate 
macroeconomic problems across the OECD, of rising prices and lowering output and 
employment, thus slowing growth rate for the western economies during the 1970s. Coupled 
with inflationary Keynesian politics, this came to generate the dread-phenomenon of 
stagflation – inflation and simultaneous productivity stagnation (Findlay & O’Rourke 
2007:495-499). An affliction that similarly crippled the Swedish economy, especially since 
the stagnation in production was met with “wage-cost explosions” demanded from the 
unions, were wages and social benefits rose markedly, causing Swedish exports to become 
less competitive, enhancing the stagnation (Magnusson 2016:427f).  
The recession bred drastic rationalisation measures and coerced a structural transformation 
from primary industries towards capital- and knowledge-intensive activities with high value 
added, such as electronics and chemical manufacturing, and an increasing share of services 
and industrial services. The transformation was very much based on the electro-technological 
development, which came to facilitate the transition from Fordism to “Toyotaism/post-
fordism” (Lundh 2010:240), which is discernible in the accelerating turnover-speed, rising 
rate of exploitation, and the incipient profit rate rebound from 1977 onwards (table 1). This 
was also facilitated by a set of devaluations of the Swedish krona up until 1982, intended to 
re-establish Swedish competitiveness, effectively neutralising the “wage-hikes” of the 70s. 
The politics of the “third way” played an important role, with trade unions agreeing on 
moderating wage-demands in exchange for supply-side economic policy aimed at curbing 
inflation and restoring profitability of companies, however, full-employment was still the 
goal. Financial markets for credit was also liberalised in the process, resulting in credit 
expansion and huge capital exports (Magnusson 2016:427f,432-433). This was a prelude to 
the rebound of the profit rate. 
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5.4.2 – Towards neoliberal capitalism & the reassertion of capitalist class-power 
What caused the rate of profit to surge – or, what made possible the augmented realisation of 
output, increased cost-competitiveness, hence valorisation of capital on an increased scale – 
in 1977-1995? 
In 1977-1995 the ratios of the profit equation (in table 1) move together; an increase in Ω 
was accompanied with an explosive increase in s’ and, therefore, p’. Underlying the increase 
in Ω is, on the one hand the heavy reduction of outlays of variable capital, only growing at 
0.43% a year, as a result of the frequent devaluations of labour of the period and the radically 
increased turnover-speed (5.56% annually). On the other the growth of fixed constant capital, 
albeit at a rate (6.73%) below the 1946-2016 average (7.87%). Outlays on circulating 
constant capital, like variable capital, saw a heavy reduction to a growth rate of 2.59% due to 
the accelerating turnover-speed. The figures suggest that among the most prevalent 
counteracting factors in neutralising the “law” are #3-6: (3) development of labour-
productivity and a creation of a surplus population of workers along with a diminished 
bargaining position; (4) cheapening of the elements of constant capital; (5) increased 
turnover-speed; and (6) foreign trade, leading to a cheapening by the necessary means of 
subsistence, either through imports or through competitive pressures forcing rationalisations 
of the domestic production process. 
Despite restored profitability, capitalist abstained from investing domestically, and growth 
remained low in 1977-1995 (figure 11 & 13, table 2 below). The 80s lingered in stagflation 
inherited from the 70s. With an overvalued currency as a contributing factor, this caused 
Swedish exporters to lose market shares, with a housing bubble building up since financial 
markets had been liberalised in 1985. A “stoppage package”, with hiked interest rates, was 
implemented 1990, which coincided with an international recession, dragging Sweden down 
with it. It was not long until prices started to fall in the real estate bubble, throwing the 
country into one of its deepest crises, as domestic demand collapsed, and unemployment rose 
radically (Magnusson 2016:434-436). The crisis was mended by a heavy devaluation of 25% 
of the currency value, as floating exchange rates were implemented 1992. Resulting in 
increasing exports, with current account surpluses starting to amount during the 1990s (figure 
11), which have been sustained into the 21th century, being one of the highest surpluses in the 
world, percentage-wise (Magnusson 2016:436-404). The period also saw a shift towards 
more “neoliberal” politics, deemphasising full-employment as a political goal, towards 
keeping inflation low and enhancing competitiveness by keeping relative costs of production 
Alexander Wulff hek12awu@student.lu.se EKHS11 
45 
 
low; a shift hurried by EU-membership. “Neoliberal” politics have often implied diminishing 
trade union power, dismantling social solidarity schemes for competitive flexibility, rolling 
back commitments of the welfare state, privatizing public enterprises, reducing taxes 
(especially on wealth and capital gains, while taxation on wages would remain), encouraging 
entrepreneurial initiatives, and create a business environment that would induce foreign 
investments (Harvey 2005:19-23; Streeck 2014:28-29). In this regard, Sweden is quite 
unique; from having had one of the harshest capital tax regimes, to perhaps one of the mildest 
ones in the West, Sweden has transformed into a European tax-haven (Waldenström 2008). 
The victory of the “neoliberal” political paradigm of austerity and liberalisation was made 
possible by the diminution of the legitimacy of the Swedish model; slow economic growth 
and increasing difficulties for the export companies; the structural transformation of the 
economy, the growth of the service and public sector, and growing influence of employed 
associated within these sectors; the political radicalisation of the workers movement and 
political polarisation; the centralised system became more rigid and gave less space for local 
influence on wage-settlements while the necessity of wage dispersion increased. Criticisms 
came from both LO and SAF, and the spirit of consensus was eventually broken. As a 
consequence, the state abandoned its former passive role and participated more actively in 
wage-settlements, through income policies and labour legislation. The conflicts between 
different unions pushed up nominal wages immensely, which in turn were eaten up by 
inflation and devaluations. The Swedish model of centralised bargaining came to be replaced 
by a relatively more decentralised and fragmentised system of bargaining, and since the 
2000s, the collective agreements have often presupposed local negotiations about the room 
for salary increase (Lundh 2010:258ff, 284-285).  
As a way to solve the brewing conflicts between labour and capital, costs has been shifted 
around in order to sustain the legitimacy of capitalism; when larger costs were incurred upon 
capitalists by the increasing wage-demands of the 70s, spawning inflation, costs were shifted 
from capitalists (by means of diminished wage-share, devaluations and precarisation) to 
governments (increasing public debt), and in the latest instance (post-1995), from 
governments (by welfare-cuts and consolidation of budgets) onto the households (by means 
of private debt), giving rise to “privatized Keynesianism” (Streeck 2014:32-39; figure 17 
below).  
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Furthermore, the global mobility of capital per se has facilitated the transition towards 
austerity and liberalisation in several ways. Firstly, it reduced states abilities to conduct 
national economic and social policy, due to the risk of big multinational companies 
threatening to relocate their activities and thus employment opportunities if the political 
conditions are considered unfavourable to them (Lundh 2010:241). Secondly, another 
important component is the liberalising and austerity pressures arising from the institutional 
owners of capital (countries’ pension funds, hedge funds, insurance companies, banks and 
investment banks) endowed with power by virtue of their ownership of governmental bonds – 
exercising disciplining power over owners and managers by hunting the firms with highest 
stock value (Magnusson 2016:445). Governments not only have to serve the interest of their 
citizens, but also the interests of bondholders, whose claims has increased as their capacity to 
assert these have risen with more liquid financial markets – effectively curtailing the 
sovereignty and democracy of states. Much like the increase of shareholder value obliges 
management to discipline its workforce and persuade or compel them to put efforts to 
increase share price, the trust of creditors requires governments to persuade/compel its 
citizens to moderate their claims on the state in favour of the financial markets. Albeit 
creditors have no voting rights, they can influence politics by selling off government bonds or 
refrain from participating in auctions of public debt. The state must thus appear credible to its 
creditors, while simultaneously gaining the support of their citizens (Streeck 2014:80-81). 
The crisis of democracy and sovereignty in late capitalism stems from the excessive – 
“exploding” – demands from the capitalist class, as they are paying increasingly little into the 
public purse, causing “structural deficits of public finances”, while their “income and assets 
have multiplied rapidly over the past twenty years, not least thanks to tax cuts, while wages 
and social services at the bottom end of society have stagnated or fallen – a development 
masked, and for a time legitimated, by money illusions supported by inflation, public debt 
and ‘credit capitalism’” (ibid:74).  
Taken as a whole, the class-power of labour has been reduced, having attained a structurally 
disadvantageous, therefore weaker bargaining position. By means of devaluation of the 
currency, coupled with precarisation/flexibilization of labour-markets and its participants, 
outlays on variable capital saw a deceleration during the period (table 1), and the share of 
labour-expenditures has declined (both with regard to variable capital in new value, as well as 
the wage-share traditionally measured figure 4 & 10 above). Real wages normally used to 
rise together with productivity, but remained flat from 1980, only picking up pace again in 
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1995 onwards.11 Furthermore, unemployment rose; from having gravitated around 2-4%, 
prior to the 1990s crisis, exploded as the crisis unfolded 1990-94, stabilising at a higher level 
of 6-8% during the 2000s, showing an inclination to increase over time (figure 12).  
Coinciding with aforementioned alterations in class-power and ideology, was the rising tide 
of ICT and “post-fordist” production processes, increasing efficiency and productivity, and, 
as a result, real wages. Albeit not total, the transition to “post-fordism” already underway in 
the 1970s and 80s in many developed countries, first started to break ground in Sweden 
during the 90s. To counter the sharpening competition from newly industrialised countries 
within traditional branches of production, industrialised countries augmented their production 
processes with ICT – with its great potential not only to cut labour-costs, but also reduce 
capital expenses by shortening its turnover (the time taken for outlays to be recuperated 
through sales), in addition to more efficient use of machinery, raw material and facilities, less 
waste, higher quality of products, reduction of interruptions, and diminished adaptation- and 
starting-times (Lundh 2010:241-242; Magnusson 2016:436-404). Post-fordism also implied a 
shift from mass production of standardised goods, to customised products of high quality and 
just-in-time deliveries to avoid building up large inventories for finished products. Lean 
production was promoted, meaning rationalisations not only with regard to labour-
productivity, but also regarding capital expenditures bound up in raw materials, finished 
products, machinery and facilities, expenditures in the organisation as such, inventories was 
slimmed down, as well as the number of workers. Flexibility in the workforce – regarding 
working hours, the size of the workforce, and acquisition of new abilities and adaptive ability 
to new functions – in order to match the ebb and flows of the business cycle was equally 
prompted (ibid:246ff). 
Constant capital saw a decline in growth rates compared to the previous period of 1946-1977, 
the relatively lower growth rates have prevailed since (table 1). Seemingly the result of the 
cheapening of machinery and equipment that took place in the 1980s onward (Schön 
2009:14), coupled with the reductions on outlays on circulating constant capital as turnover-
speed has been accelerated through aforementioned “post-fordist” practices. 
Taken as a whole the reductions in costs of production (cf, cc & v) rendered the Swedish 
production process relatively more efficient, cost-competitive and capable to capture a larger 
                                                          
11 Compare the real wage trends of figure 15 below with real-labour productivity growth in figure 9 & 14 (also 
presented in appendix table 3). 
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share of the total surplus-value as market-shares was conquered. The discernible increase in 
the appropriation12 of surplus-value, s’ in 1977-1995 being an expression of the political, 
organisational and rationalising measures taken in order to cut costs. Furthermore, the growth 
rate of the organic composition of capital was retarded by the diminished costs of production, 
which – coupled with a enhanced s’ – caused the profit rate to surge. (See table 1 or appendix 
table 2.) 
Augmented by the liberalisation of capital markets – and the enforced bargaining position of 
capital it imparted – the health of the profit rate and the competitiveness of Swedish 
industries was restored, and soon current accounts surplus started to amount. Perhaps best 
portrayed in figure 11, showing a shift of capital from domestic investments to foreign direct 
investments; production-oriented investments as a share of surplus exhibiting a drop from 9% 
in 1990 to – 1.2% in 1993, after which it keeps a stable level under 3%; FDI more or less 
explodes, especially as it runs up towards the IT-crash, but keeps a relatively high level 
afterwards as well. Net-exports as a share of GDP after having seen a rise and fall during the 
1980s, gains a share of about 5-7% throughout 1995-2016. The pattern is quite clear: a larger 
part of the accumulation of capital is taking place abroad rather than domestically.  
While the neoliberal political regime and the post-fordist organization of production 
performed wonders for the Swedish capitalist class, it did less so with regard to growth. 
Eventually, in the mid-1990s, the law came to assert itself on the Swedish economy. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: 
Accumulation, 1946-
2016 
Sources: Investment, 
surplus, GDP and 
export/import data 
for 1946-1993 from 
Edvinsson (2005), 
and for 1994-2016 
from SCB (2016); 
FDI for 1946-2016 
from SCB (2016). 
                                                          
12 I write “appropriation” since, in an open economy, surplus-value don’t merely reflect the increased 
exploitation of the national workforce, but also the surplus appropriated through the conquest of market-shares 
in competition, and thus appropriation of surplus-labour of foreign countries’ workforces. 
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Figure 12: 
Unemployment, 
1970-2016 
Source: SCB (2017). 
5.4.3 – The heaviest matter of the bourgeoisie mode of production13 
What developments explain the reassertion of the law since 1995? How has the neoliberal 
political-economic regime performed? 
For a brief moment, Capitalism – or, as Marx termed it: the bourgeoisie mode of production – 
in Sweden seemed to defy the “law”, but the surge in the profit rate in 1977-1995 was only an 
intermission in the historically normal gravitational pull of swelling capital in relation to 
labour. 
After 1995 the ratios in table 1 show a clearly negative correlation to each other, with an 
increase in Ω only being marginally associated with an increase in s’, and more associated 
with a decline in p’. The growth of the components of constant capital retain similar rates as 
the preceding period, while outlays on variable capital expands from the previous low 0.48 to 
2.24%; while the share of v in new value L on the whole has remained relatively unchanged 
in 1995-2016 (figure 10), the growth in outlays on variable capital seem to be due to a 
deceleration in turnover-speed from 5.56 to 1.44%, which, in effect, translates into increasing 
outlays on variable capital. In the end, the Ω increases in 1995-2016, unable to facilitate 
productive capacity and competitiveness enough to raise the exploitation/appropriation of 
surplus-value – consequently bringing the rate of profit down. While the fall in the profit rate 
in 1946-1977 seemed to be equally due to labour squeezing profit, as well as an increasing 
organic composition of capital, the fall post-1995 is more unambiguously due to the latter.  
                                                          
13 The title is an allusion to the song The heaviest matter of the universe, by Gojira. 
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Performance-wise, the measures taken to restore profitability in 1977-1995 performed 
relatively worse than both the preceding and succeeding period with regard to real GDP 
growth. It seems as if periods of falling profitability are likewise – at least in 1946-2016 – 
periods of high real GDP growth (figure 13, table 2). Moreover, the neoliberal political 
project has also performed quite badly with regards to accumulation, shifting away 
investments from the domestic economy – contrary to expectations of “a good business 
environment” leading to more domestic investments. Far from seeing a wave of investments 
indicative of a transformation ala Schön during the 80s, investments decline successively. In 
a way, capitalism has bred a sort of mercantilism, where production for home-markets is 
abandoned in favour for export-orientation, since the home-markets – due to the shrinking 
wage-share – is incapable of absorbing the output. 
 
Table 2: Average real GDP growth rate 
1951-1977 3.44 
1977-1995 1.67 
1995-2016 2.59 
 
Michael Kalecki in his 1943 article on Political Aspects of Full-employment anticipated the 
limits of combating unemployment by stimulating private investments – through interest rate 
and income tax reductions – arguing that in sharp slumps or downturns, and the pessimistic 
view of the future arising out of that, may have little or no effect upon output- and 
                                                          
14 See appendix table 3 for data-series. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Real 
GDP growth 
rates, 1951-
2016 
Source: SCB 
(2016).14 
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employment-generating investments. It can further be argued that the greater international 
mobility of capital has raised the “reservation profit” – “the lowest rate of profit that an 
investor will tolerate in order to put his or her money to work” (Streeck 2014:75n54). It’s not 
farfetched to conclude – in concurrence with David Harvey (2005:19) – that the neoliberal 
counterrevolution was a project to not only restore conditions of capital accumulation – 
which it seemingly failed – but also to re-establish the class-exemption of the representatives 
of capital.  
One expression of the class-power of capital is the increasing surplus-share (figure 6 & 10), 
and the subsequent rising inequality. While Sweden remains among the top ten most equal 
OECD countries, they still exhibited the most rapid surge of income inequality among all 
OECD countries, from a Gini of 0.19 in 1985 to 0.27 in 2010 (OECD 2013; 2015). Gains 
from capital assets are usually disregarded in studies on income inequality; taking capital 
gains into consideration, “the inequality trend since 1980 [is not only] steeper, but it also 
begins earlier (in the early 1980s instead of the 1990s, when excluding capital gains)” (Roine 
& Waldenström 2012:576). Schön argues that the variation in income distribution vary over 
the structural cycle, with periods of transformation diminishing the wage-share, accordingly 
expanding the profit-share, with rationalisation periods often implying an increase in the 
wage-share and squeezing of the profit-share (Schön 2009:21f). When assessing the turnover-
adjusted wage- and surplus-share, there is no indication for such a pattern, although the 
“conventional” measures of wage- and surplus-share supports Schön’s claim (figure 4). With 
regard to trends in inequality, income dispersion is not narrowing down.  
These developments in profitability and political economy is an important backdrop to which 
I argue one is to understand the stagnation period of 2007-2014. 
5.5 – What is stagnating & why? 
Aggregate real labour-productivity has exhibited an increase up until 2006/2007, with an 
annual growth of 2.727% between 1993 and 2007, after which the performance of 
productivity growth decelerates to 0.299% (figure 14, table 3). Under this aggregate unravels 
diverse patterns with regard to production and non-production-activities (since we’re 
interested in productivity growth with regard to value formation). While non-production-
activities, exhibiting a generally lower dynamism, already experienced a slowdown in 
productivity growth in 2003, production-activities largely follows the pattern suggested by 
Storm’s (2017) result of the “dynamic” sector (which slightly differ from the present thesis 
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definition of “production” sector), with productivity growth accelerating in three steps up 
until 2007/8; about 2.5% in 1981-1993, ca 5.3% in 1993-2007, followed by a slower annual 
growth of 0.485% in 2007-2015. This periodisation fits Schön’s phases of transformation and 
rationalisation quite well, with low productivity growth during the transformation phase 
taking place before the 1990s, and accelerating productivity growth in the subsequent post-
1990/1995 rationalisation phase (Schön 2009:16f; Edvinsson 2010a/b:677).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Real 
labour-
productivity, 
1981-2015 
Sources: Real 
GDP from SCB 
(2016); worked 
hours from SCB 
(2017). 
 
Table 3: Annual percentage change in real labour-productivity 
 
Production-
activities 
Non-production-
activities 
Total 
economy 
1981-1993 2.492 0.698 1.399 
1993-2007 5.256 1.328 2.727 
2007-2015 0.485 0.736 0.527 
 
Technical change accelerated in production-activities, up until 2007/8, while it has 
decelerated in non-production-activities since 2002/3. Hence, lingering stagnation mainly 
pertain to the period after 2007/8 – and non-production-activities since 2002/3. In the 
following sections, we’ll examine why technical change, or productivity growth, have 
stagnated in production-activities since 2007/8, and how the accelerating productivity up until 
2007/8 and the subsequent stagnation and depression since, can be explained by the Marxian 
“law of the tendential fall of the profit rate”.  
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5.5.1 – Fading impetus to technical change? 
As suggested by Storm (2017), real wages are the driver of technical change and productivity 
raising measures. But since wages, as usually measured – the total sum wages paid out during 
the course of the year – isn’t representative of the actual outlays on wages of capitalists, since 
it doesn’t take into consideration the speed at which the outlays are recuperated through sales 
(turnover-time), the measure of turnover-adjusted variable capital suggested by the present 
study, is argued to be a more proper measure. Figure 15 below suggests that while real wage 
growth exhibits a similar trend to real labour-productivity, outlays on variable capital follows 
productivity perhaps closer.  
Around 2007, productivity breaks down, and v stagnates in 2008, and thus the impetus to 
innovate lessens. The increasing outlays on variable capital during the 1990s and 2000s is 
due to turnover-speed exhibiting a slowdown in 1990-2009 (figure 3); it takes longer for 
outlays on wages to be recuperated, which effectively translates into increasing outlays on 
variable capital; wage-costs for companies experiences a general increase as turnover-speed 
decelerate, meaning increasing incentive to diminish wage-costs by technical change. This is 
also reflected in the trends in the above figure 15 where variable capital growth steepens 
around 1993/4 to 2008, which could be interpreted as stirring the accelerated productivity 
growth during that period.  
5.5.2 – Starving in the belly of a whale15 
The results so far carry quite contradictory and counterintuitive messages; while the profit 
rate of production-activities commenced its decline already in 1995, labour-productivity 
                                                          
15 After the song, with the same title, by Tom Waits. 
 
Figure 15: 
Driver of 
technical 
change, 1981-
2015 
Sources: 
Productivity (see 
figure 14); 
compensation for 
1981-1993 from 
Edvinsson 
(2005), and for 
1994-2016 from 
SCB (2016); real 
wages from SCB 
(2016). 
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growth continued to increase and even accelerated between 1993-2007/8, only to attain 
stagnation in the wake of the financial crisis. It’s a clear break between profitability and 
productivity which exhibit opposite trends up until 2008. How is the lag in labour-
productivity to be reconciled with the antecedent fall in profitability? 
The Marxian notion of productivity stipulates that competition compels individual capitals to 
productivity-enhancing technical change in order to attain above average profits, but a 
general raise in economy-wide productivity also causes the average profit to fall. In this 
process, not only is a falling rate of profit the result of a Marx-biased (labour-saving and 
capital-using) technical change undertaken in order to gain competitive advantages and hence 
extra-profits, but a falling rate of profit could itself spur accelerating technical change as 
firms frenetically struggles not to lose ground; the falling profit rate is both cause and effect 
of competitive pressures generating a “Marx-biased technical change”. I argue that the 
increased real labour-productivity post-1993, in the face of the declining profit rate from 
1995, should be interpreted as the point where an overproduction of commodities was starting 
to amount – an overproduction of commodities merely being the expression of an 
overaccumulation of capital, the point where an investment generates a profit equal to, or 
lower than the initial investment. A successive gap between actual output and potential output 
developed (cf. Summers 2014; Storm 2017). Already in the 1980s, Sweden seemed to 
experience an overproduction of commodities, when current account surpluses started to 
build, as a cause and response to the falling wage-share; cause in the sense that it made 
Swedish exports more cost-competitive; response in the sense that the home-market became 
less able to absorb the output, therefore redirecting accumulation to an international sphere 
(momentarily deferring problems of overaccumulation). After 1995 Sweden started to 
experience overproduction (and finally, overaccumulation) with regard to foreign trade as 
well – perhaps as a result of similar developments of declining wage-shares in foreign 
countries.  
With the accelerated real labour-productivity, its labour-saving effect, and a successively 
diminishing share of variable capital – reaching lows of 11-17% of total new value from 1989 
onwards (figure 10; see also wage-share figure 4). Consequently, difficulties of realising 
output arose, i.e. demand-problems; the decreasing turnover-speed of 1990-2009 being an 
indicator for realisation problems as demand dries up, since variable capital isn’t spent at 
previous velocity, which translates into heavier felt outlays for capitalists. Subsequently a 
problem of imperfect valorisation commenced (overaccumulation), a problem momentarily 
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solved, hidden and postponed by credit expansion. These developments proceeded until the 
point where the fall in the profit rate no longer was outweighed by an increase in the mass of 
surplus-value as seen in figure 16.16 A drop in the profit rate was still associated with an 
absolute increase in the mass of surplus-value up until 2006, when the mass of new value 
generated (and thus surplus-value) began to stagnate, signalling an upcoming crisis, followed 
by the contraction of the mass of surplus-value (total profit) in 2007-2008.  
The expansion of private credit, while of course being made possible by deregulated capital 
markets, is equally symptomatic of overaccumulated capital looking for profitable outlets 
through speculation (figure 17). While public debt has been consolidated since the end of the 
1990s, private household and corporate debt has bloated; while household debt increased 
                                                          
16 Figure 16 is the same as figure 10, but shown as stacked shares of magnitude. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: 
Absolute 
magnitude of 
new value 
produced / 
appropriated 
Source: see 
figure 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Debt 
& inflation rate, 
1980-2016 
Source: SCB 
(2016). 
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more or less steadily since the deregulation of the financial markets in 1995, corporate debt 
(for which the data acquired only stretch 1998-2016), saw a drastic increase from 2006, 
which, coincidentally was when the fall in the profit rate no longer was outweighed by an 
increase in the mass of surplus-value. 
Value-creation and surplus-value appropriation recovered in 2009 to pre-crisis levels, and 
have since 2014 started to expand again (enabling the private sector to amortise its debt, as 
seen in the declining debt-surplus share of 2014-2016 in figure 17), seemingly, propelled by a 
raised rate of surplus-value from 2013-2016, and accelerated turnover-speed from 2009 
onwards (appendix table 2, figure 3). But the share of v in new value created have declined 
further after 2014, the expansion of household debt is still steadily increasing, and the rate of 
profit has yet to show a healthy recovering upward trend – suggesting that the underlying 
problem of imperfect valorisation of capital remains.  
5.6 – Conclusion & discussion  
Sweden exhibits a long-term secular decline in the rate of profit throughout the late 19th and 
20th century. For the period 1950-2016, the Swedish economy demonstrates the underlying 
“Marx-biased”, labour-saving and capital-using technical change that is to be expected as a 
driver of the “law of the tendency of the profit rate to fall”. Furthermore, as a response of the 
profitability crisis emanating from the Industrial Golden Age of the Swedish Model 
stretching from the 1950s to the 1970s – the neoliberal political regime and post-fordist 
practices aimed to restore profitability, which saw a surge from 1977 to 1995, although 
growth rates remained lower than both the preceding period of 1946-1977, and the 
succeeding of 1995-2016. The neoliberal political economy facilitated the erosion of the 
demand-base (by reducing the wage-share in the domestic economy), thus undermining any 
real growth. From 1995 onwards the law of the tendential fall of the profit rate started to 
assert itself once again, and problems of insufficient demand started to surface. Swedish 
capitalism entered a period of overaccumulation, a problem postponed and veiled by credit 
expansion as idle capital flows into speculation for profitable investment outlets. The late 
secular stagnation is but an expression of this. 
The whole postwar period experienced a rapid increase in productivity, up until 2007/8, even 
after the profit rate started to fall in 1995, when real labour-productivity actually started to 
accelerate. This is in no way a contradiction as rapidly rising productivity is both the cause 
and effect of falling profitability, propelled by fierce international competition. With the 
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eruption of the financial crisis, the eroding demand-base became evident, and stagnation 
followed. 
The Swedish economy has yet to rid itself of crippling overaccumulation, as the general 
profit rate remains low, the wage-share declining, unable to valorise the successively swelling 
capital; i.e. low demand cripples the economy, momentarily mended by credit expansion. The 
system is in need of expansion and stimulated demand, with new profitable outlets that can 
incorporate more value-creating workers. Politics focused on profitability, as in 1977-1995, 
has proved to be unsuccessful with regards to inclusive growth, and instead seem to be 
generating growing inequalities. As long as inclusive conditions for accumulation is not 
established – either by en masse destruction of capital value setting the stage for a new boom 
or structural cycle (“creative destruction”); by establishing new markets and incorporating 
new masses of value-creating workforces; by commodifying new social spaces and functions 
(by means of structural transformation or intensification of the present techno-economic 
paradigm); or any other measures that can create conditions for demand-stimulus – further 
concentration of capital among a few is expected as a compensatory strategy for falling 
profitability, with a continuing proliferation of the systemic violence of inequality 
disintegrating society as class-polarisation (resentment, segregation, crime, health- and life-
chance differences) accentuates. 
Marx claim that capitalism is incapable of generating full-employment and sufficient demand 
by its own dynamics rings true. And rather than being a purely supply- or demand-side 
phenomenon, the crises and stagnation it brings about seem to arise “organically” out of the 
dynamics of capital accumulation: by diminishing its demand-base sustaining the process, 
further accumulation is curtailed or undermined, tendentially creating a “gap” between actual 
output and potential output as capital and capacity swells beyond demand. To establish 
favourable – with regard to wage-dependants – conditions of accumulation, capital is 
dependent upon state support. Although a politics of demand-stimulus seem to be desirable 
from the perspective of maximizing economic growth – albeit less desirable from the 
perspective of environmental sustainability – the possibilities of pursuing such policies are 
limited by the class-power-equilibrium upheld by the conditions of global capital mobility. 
It’s hard to see how Sweden – a small trade-dependent country – could pursue such policies 
unrestrainedly without the leverage of a global change in ideological and political-economic 
regime. The changes required taking power back from global capital, likewise need to be 
transnational in character. 
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5.6.1 – Further research 
Since Marx’s mode of analysis deemphasise the nation as a unit of analysis, it would be more 
appropriate to apply his theoretical framework on larger regions, or a network of relatively 
more connected trade nodes (i.e. countries that tend to be more intertwined economically). 
Furthermore, Marx’s theory implies, or hints at, a trade theory of absolute advantage – which 
Anwar Shaikh (2016) has developed further – that could shed light on the relationship 
between differing organic compositions of capital, and how they mediate competitiveness and 
conquests of market-shares. Perhaps one would gain insights of how global inequalities and 
credit-debt-relations (such as that between Germany and Greece, or the U.S. and China) 
emerge. Another field of research would be the relationship between movements in the rate 
of profit as a driver of development blocks and structural cycles (see footnote 2 above).  
  
Alexander Wulff hek12awu@student.lu.se EKHS11 
59 
 
Appendix 
Table 1: different results due to different definitions of capital stock. Based on data for output, 
compensation, capital stock and employment from SCB (2016; 2017). 
Profit rates & organic composition of capital for productive activities, 
for total private capital stock, and “productive (‘proper’) capital stock” 
respectively, 1993-2014, in % 
 
p' 
 
 
 
“Proper” 
p' 
 
 
Ω 
 
 
 
“Proper” 
Ω 
 
 
Ratio of 
p' to 
“proper” 
p' 
Ratio of 
Ω to 
“proper” 
Ω 
1993 18.11 22.76 30.32 24.76 0.80 1.22 
1994 20.99 26.31 32.41 26.96 0.80 1.20 
1995 24.15 30.50 31.95 26.82 0.79 1.19 
1996 22.14 27.24 24.67 21.03 0.81 1.17 
1997 21.98 27.33 26.70 22.39 0.80 1.19 
1998 21.69 27.17 27.00 22.35 0.80 1.21 
1999 21.42 26.45 28.24 23.45 0.81 1.20 
2000 20.72 26.19 28.64 23.04 0.79 1.24 
2001 19.05 24.28 27.77 21.84 0.78 1.27 
2002 18.21 22.97 28.86 22.71 0.79 1.27 
2003 18.34 23.27 29.57 23.27 0.79 1.27 
2004 18.95 24.60 31.69 24.54 0.77 1.29 
2005 18.27 23.70 32.30 24.87 0.77 1.30 
2006 18.82 24.83 32.84 25.03 0.76 1.31 
2007 18.89 25.50 34.03 25.41 0.74 1.34 
2008 16.92 22.71 35.26 25.98 0.75 1.36 
2009 13.34 16.87 37.01 27.13 0.79 1.36 
2010 15.61 21.08 41.61 29.90 0.74 1.39 
2011 15.45 21.16 41.71 29.61 0.73 1.41 
2012 14.40 19.49 43.04 30.39 0.74 1.42 
2013 13.79 18.80 45.21 31.38 0.73 1.44 
2014 13.68 18.74 47.79 32.83 0.73 1.46 
Annual 
percentage 
change -1.33 -0.92 2.19 1.35 
   
Table 2: Profit rate, rate of surplus-value/exploitation/appropriation, organic composition of 
capital, variable capital, constant capital, and turnover-time. Based on data for output, 
compensation, employment, capital stock, intermediate consumption, and inventory stock from 
Edvinsson (2005) for 1946-1993, and from SCB (2016; 2017) for 1994-2016. 
Year 
Rate of 
profit 
(p'), in 
Rate of 
surplus-
value 
Organic 
composition 
of capital 
Variable 
capital, 
indexed 
Circulating 
constant 
capital 
Fixed 
constant 
capital 
Turnover-
time, n 
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% (s') (Ω) for 
number of 
productive 
workers, 
turnover-
adjusted 
(v), in 
millions 
SEK 
(turnover-
adjusted) 
(cc), in 
millions 
SEK 
(cf), in 
millions 
SEK 
1946 21.49 2.52 10.74 3268 6834 28253 3.19 
1947 21.98 2.50 10.39 3677 7635 30560 3.18 
1948 20.69 2.33 10.25 4211 8824 34339 3.06 
1949 18.57 1.99 9.73 4845 10123 37023 2.83 
1950 19.70 2.15 9.90 5188 11287 40083 2.75 
1951 22.07 2.60 10.76 6011 14110 50588 2.81 
1952 20.12 2.44 11.14 6774 14935 60509 2.92 
1953 17.13 2.01 10.72 7426 16121 63475 2.69 
1954 17.45 1.92 10.02 8186 17812 64251 2.55 
1955 17.29 1.98 10.46 8448 18212 70134 2.71 
1956 16.95 1.98 10.66 9228 20377 77991 2.63 
1957 15.04 1.69 10.22 10698 23566 85724 2.42 
1958 14.14 1.56 10.03 11442 24693 90026 2.34 
1959 13.84 1.52 10.00 12100 27218 93736 2.26 
1960 14.77 1.69 10.44 12428 27537 102235 2.43 
1961 15.41 1.85 10.98 12756 27841 112288 2.59 
1962 14.40 1.65 10.46 14802 31073 123770 2.48 
1963 13.41 1.53 10.44 16125 34403 133980 2.42 
1964 14.51 1.70 10.75 17095 37066 146649 2.50 
1965 14.54 1.74 10.96 18493 40427 162231 2.54 
1966 13.31 1.58 10.84 20462 44350 177397 2.47 
1967 12.84 1.52 10.82 22177 47455 192529 2.42 
1968 12.17 1.45 10.92 23422 51542 204287 2.37 
1969 13.23 1.62 11.27 23646 53219 213177 2.47 
1970 13.77 1.78 11.93 24506 56833 235401 2.60 
1971 12.48 1.63 12.06 27333 63249 266499 2.47 
1972 11.20 1.42 11.73 31031 72725 291166 2.31 
1973 12.12 1.65 12.60 32056 81330 322475 2.37 
1974 13.76 2.08 14.09 33533 92299 380023 2.64 
1975 13.77 2.13 14.49 37359 95632 445549 2.76 
1976 12.53 1.91 14.21 43573 110124 509053 2.75 
1977 10.44 1.58 14.16 49120 124289 571209 2.63 
1978 9.43 1.44 14.23 54245 138728 633313 2.59 
1979 11.18 1.81 15.19 53608 148517 665627 2.83 
1980 12.54 2.24 16.85 52570 148587 737181 3.21 
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1981 12.32 2.38 18.36 52683 152396 814596 3.43 
1982 12.32 2.50 19.30 55372 171362 897411 3.42 
1983 12.47 2.62 19.99 59764 197037 997521 3.35 
1984 14.27 3.13 20.94 60146 203105 1056502 3.63 
1985 15.09 3.59 22.82 58120 196292 1129866 4.07 
1986 16.14 3.98 23.66 58793 192684 1198541 4.34 
1987 16.66 4.24 24.43 60057 198935 1268319 4.55 
1988 17.61 5.03 27.55 56953 191761 1377429 5.23 
1989 18.55 5.76 30.05 56746 193664 1511385 5.80 
1990 17.97 5.81 31.31 59382 201203 1658257 6.07 
1991 17.16 5.42 30.62 63439 205658 1736537 5.83 
1992 16.90 5.17 29.63 64890 207283 1715382 5.47 
1993 15.75 5.49 33.86 57969 205448 1757443 5.84 
1994 18.30 6.80 36.17 53852 202329 1745511 6.54 
1995 21.02 7.72 35.72 56304 212222 1798956 6.77 
1996 18.68 5.46 28.25 75225 268826 1856143 5.42 
1997 18.68 5.87 30.41 74707 276701 1994938 5.66 
1998 18.50 5.86 30.65 79001 288685 2132838 5.67 
1999 18.39 6.05 31.90 79667 291992 2249533 5.93 
2000 17.75 5.93 32.43 85913 326040 2460250 5.89 
2001 16.28 5.29 31.50 97035 362038 2694418 5.55 
2002 15.67 5.25 32.52 98639 361147 2846255 5.56 
2003 15.85 5.42 33.21 99688 363143 2947805 5.55 
2004 16.43 6.00 35.55 97661 376407 3095136 5.74 
2005 15.80 5.90 36.36 100157 406766 3235300 5.76 
2006 16.23 6.18 37.08 104467 443195 3430349 5.72 
2007 16.37 6.43 38.27 108439 460169 3690139 5.97 
2008 14.75 5.97 39.46 114609 481402 4041395 6.01 
2009 11.77 4.94 40.93 115607 454230 4278061 5.73 
2010 13.89 6.50 45.75 106506 440641 4432104 6.37 
2011 13.75 6.44 45.86 110051 455998 4590587 6.53 
2012 12.90 6.20 47.05 109905 441193 4730381 6.74 
2013 12.44 6.23 49.09 107898 418006 4878571 6.95 
2014 12.41 6.54 51.67 106738 414434 5100909 7.21 
2015 13.13 7.30 54.59 105246 379393 5366412 7.87 
2016 13.31 7.94 58.66 102355 358153 5645736 8.36 
 
Table 3: Real GDP by expenditure in 2010 years prices, real GDP growth rates, & real wage. Based 
on data for output, and wages from SCB (2016), and worked hours from Edvinsson (2005) for 
1950-1993, and SCB (2017) for 1994-2015.  
Years 
Real GDP by 
expenditure, in 
Real GDP 
growth rates, 
Real labour-
productivity, total 
Real wage, 
index 1960 = 
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2010 years prices from previous 
year 
economy, in 2010 
years prices (GDP by 
expenditure per 
10,000 hours 
worked) 
100 
1950 698689 
 
205,4621 
 1951 717073 2,631214 221,9901 
 1952 727561 1,462613 132,0878 
 1953 753100 3,510221 125,5748 
 1954 798373 6,011552 175,0925 
 1955 821004 2,83464 147,6222 
 1956 847909 3,277085 131,1832 
 1957 867154 2,269701 130,194 
 1958 888532 2,465306 122,0771 
 1959 935267 5,259799 132,6302 
 1960 968024 3,502422 132,3987 100 
1961 1020770 5,448832 103,3343 104,9843 
1962 1064223 4,256885 101,1868 110,4493 
1963 1120727 5,309414 106,2369 115,2635 
1964 1197031 6,808438 114,7743 119,9564 
1965 1243071 3,846183 99,5076 125,2676 
1966 1270313 2,191508 91,55588 129,3487 
1967 1314422 3,472294 86,42413 135,3752 
1968 1361641 3,592377 93,26487 141,4729 
1969 1428001 4,873531 101,8651 147,4279 
1970 1525980 6,86127 93,20449 150,8374 
1971 1541901 1,04333 71,99388 154,8691 
1972 1576768 2,2613 78,90964 160,1261 
1973 1639752 3,9945 81,70741 161,7411 
1974 1694112 3,315135 77,40643 162,219 
1975 1736757 2,517248 52,17211 170,4757 
1976 1757938 1,219572 41,41581 175,7836 
1977 1733462 -1,39231 41,4579 174,1693 
1978 1761703 1,629168 51,00914 175,7475 
1979 1828902 3,814434 66,13872 180,9562 
1980 1860426 1,723657 51,71753 173,2746 
1981 1855673 -0,25548 37,63599 168,1039 
1982 1882132 1,425844 40,3638 164,2481 
1983 1920860 2,057667 41,84304 160,2718 
1984 2003353 4,294587 40,43107 160,0184 
1985 2048868 2,271941 34,15213 160,2825 
1986 2108836 2,926885 27,82628 167,3123 
1987 2177701 3,265546 30,06986 170,8889 
1988 2231280 2,460347 26,83997 172,1446 
1989 2286235 2,462936 24,93967 177,9252 
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1990 2304516 0,799612 20,22002 176,6416 
1991 2280853 -1,02681 19,92177 170,3407 
1992 2258614 -0,97503 26,44073 172,7033 
1993 2214379 -1,9585 27,93975 169,6427 
1994 2304894 4,087602 33,02829 170,0501 
1995 2397650 4,024307 23,06943 171,3476 
1996 2434043 1,517861 17,02885 180,8041 
1997 2504642 2,900483 16,48962 188,0746 
1998 2610508 4,226792 15,84814 195,4775 
1999 2728768 4,530153 14,99947 201,191 
2000 2857983 4,735287 14,48612 206,5876 
2001 2902665 1,56341 13,6765 210,6827 
2002 2962854 2,073577 14,27968 214,7617 
2003 3033540 2,38574 16,92044 218,143 
2004 3164605 4,32053 18,61156 224,5175 
2005 3253794 2,81833 20,37832 230,4916 
2006 3406336 4,688127 20,20613 234,4696 
2007 3522320 3,404949 21,92941 237,0063 
2008 3502699 -0,55705 20,38535 239,0545 
2009 3321096 -5,18466 16,58714 247,8789 
2010 3519994 5,988927 19,68798 251,1365 
2011 3613781 2,664408 21,04792 250,6426 
2012 3603434 -0,28632 19,40934 255,9064 
2013 3648160 1,241205 18,19746 262,3582 
2014 3743012 2,599996 18,90831 270,2034 
2015 3895912 4,084945 19,45126 276,8747 
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